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FEDERALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND THE REALPOLITIK OF FOOTNOTE FOUR
Robert A. Destro*
In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled
by itself
Second It is of great importance in a republic
not only to guard the society against the oppression of
its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the
injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily
exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority
will be insecure. 1
INTRODUCTION
Whatever one thinks of the Rehnquist Court's judicial
philosophy, its determination to enforce the boundaries that the
Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of Congress, the federal
courts, and the states, respectively, has had at least three salutary
effects.
. Professor of Law & Director, Interdisciplinary Program in Law &
Religion, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law,
Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1975, University of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1972,
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.
' THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 164 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
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" The first is that the Court's federalism and separation of
powers jurisprudence is forcing a long overdue
reexamination of important, but largely unsupportable
assumptions about the nature and allocation of political
jurisdiction under the United States Constitution.
" The second is that concerns about "judicial activism,"
2
however defined, extend across the political spectrum, and
are fueling the growth of a healthy political realism about
2 1 place the term in quotes because its meaning varies widely from person
to person and from left to right on the political spectrum. Professor Mark
Tushnet provides a useful typology in Mark V. Tushnet, Comment, The Role of
the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 147
(1987) (noting six meanings of the term "activist:" (1) when courts decide issues
not actually before them, (2) when courts readily disregard precedent without
first having determined that actual "problems have[] arisen in the administration
of the [prior] rule," (3) decisions that "substitute[] the judgment of unelected
judges for those of elected decision makers," (4) certain uses and abuses of "the
jurisprudence of 'original intention,"' (5) cases in which "an activist court is an
arm of an activist government," and (6) as a "praise" or "blame" word). Id. at
147-53. Professor Stephen F. Smith has remarked, when used in the "praise" or
"blame" sense identified by Tushnet, "[t]he term serves principally as the utmost
judicial put-down, a polemical, if unenlightening, way of expressing strong
opposition to a judicial decision or approach to judging." Stephen F. Smith,
Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1057,
1077 (2002) (citations omitted). For a recent sampling of articles on the topic,
see, for example., John Paul Stevens, Judicial Activism: Ensuring the Powers
and Freedoms Conceived by the Framers for Today's World, 25 CHI. B. REC.
(October 16, 2002); Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Activist"
Court? The Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275 (2002);
William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1217 (2002); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and
Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139 (2002). See also JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES (2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 198, 210 (1985) (referring to judicial activism as courts "acting
contrary to the will of the other branches of government" and thereby "taking
power from th[ose] other branches"); Glendon Schubert, A Functional
Interpretation, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 17 (David F. Forte ed., 1972) (noting that a
court "is activist when[ever] its [policies are in] conflict with those of other
major decision-makers").
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the nature and limitations of what Raoul Berger has called
"Government by Judiciary.
'"3
e The third is that the overtly political nature of the
discussion provides a golden opportunity to examine both
the nature and the extent of the political power the Court
claims for itself under the rubric of "substantive due
process."
The loaded question that serves as the title of this symposium
underscores the need for such an inquiry. If the Rehnquist Court's
federalism and separation of powers jurisprudence actually does
pose a threat to the post-New Deal allocation of political power
among Congress, the Court, the President, and the States, we
cannot assume at the outset, as the editors have, that the New Deal
is, or should be, the starting point for the discussion. We must look
first at the Court's pre- and post-1936 assumptions about how
power is allocated in our "compound republic."
This is a tall order. At least three generations of American
lawyers and judges uncritically accept the proposition that the
power equations embedded in the Court's post-1936 jurisprudence
are integral components of "the very principles that have shaped
our country since the New Deal.",4 Professor Bruce Ackerman's
theory that the "crisis of 1937" was part of a fundamental
reallocation of political power-a "constitutional moment"-is an
3 Raoul Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). In
support of this argument, Professor Kramer stated that:
There is ... a world of difference between having
the last word and having the only word: between
judicial supremacy and judicial sovereignty. We
may choose to accept judicial supremacy, because
we need someone to settle certain constitutional
questions .... But it does not follow either that the
Court must wield its authority over every question
or that, when it does, the Court can dismiss or too
quickly supplant the views of other, more democratic
institutions.
Id. at 12.
4 Matthew B. Stein, Note, Something Wicked This Way Comes:
Constitutional Transformation and the Growing Power of the Supreme Court,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 581 (2002) (citations omitted).
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extended argument that those power equations should be viewed as
part and parcel of the Constitution itself.5 Others make the less
sweeping but equally political claim that the "crisis of 1937" was
one of several "dramatic episodes of alteration in the institutional
and political realities of U.S. public life.",6 Either way, the
conventional wisdom is that our national commitment to the
protection of both human rights and representative democracy
depends upon an uncritical acceptance of the Court's post-1936
vision of its own power.7
This Essay argues two propositions diametrically opposed to
the conventional wisdom. The first is that our national commitment
to the protection of human rights and representative democracy
supports the Rehnquist Court's penchant for looking critically at
any claim of power to make or alter substantive policy. The second
is that the "new federalism" cases can only be understood in light
of the Rehnquist Court's deep skepticism about the most dangerous
power claim of all: that the Due Process Clause confers on the
Court a prescriptive and preemptive authority to define the
substantive content of liberty and equality.
In the pages that follow, I will argue that neither the "crisis of
1937," the controversy over the Rehnquist Court's "new
federalism," nor the bare knuckle, political struggle between
Senate Democrats and President Bush over control of the judicial
5 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, Foundations in WE THE PEOPLE (1991)
(hereinafter ACKERMAN Foundations) (distinguishing periods of ordinary
lawmaking from "constitutional moments" in which the political branches,
acting in furtherance of a popular political mandate, effect a major reallocation
in the operational distribution of power).
6 Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Rehnquist Court and State Sovereignty:
Limitations of the New Federalism, 12 WIDENER L.J. 459, 515 (2003). See also
Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States'
Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343 (2003); James Gray
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1990).
7 See, e.g., Address of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton to the Convention
of The Constitution Society, Friday, August 1, 2003 (arguing that the Court's
federalism and separation of powers cases are not only "legally dubious," they
also have "made a mockery of one of our most cherished constitutional rights,
the right to vote." Associated Press, Clinton: Court Rulings Don't Erase
Distrust, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Saturday, August 2, 2003, at 23, 2003, WL
3598689.
[Vol. 12
THE REALPOLITIK OF FOOTNOTE FOUR
power the United States can be understood without first carefully
distinguishing the power of judicial review conferred by Article III
and claimed in Marbury v. Madison,8 from the power to define the
substantive concepts of "liberty" and equality claimed by the Court
since the mid-19th century. The former is the power to declare
which claimant to an existing authority is the proper delegate under
the Constitution. The latter is a claim by the judiciary that it has the
power to make or alter substantive policy ab initio.
Because the power of judicial review rests on the proposition
"that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the
commission under which it is exercised, is void,"9 the question for
discussion here is whether anything that happened during the
"crisis of 1937" supports the blank check the Court appears to have
written itself in footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products, Co.'0 and its accompanying text.
We begin the discussion by acknowledging the obvious. The
defeat of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's March 9, 1937 "court
reorganization plan" had significant political effects. The most
important of these was a practical redistribution of political power
among the branches of the federal government, and between the
federal government and the states. The Rehnquist Court's
federalism and separation of powers cases challenge not only the
wisdom of that redistribution, but also its constitutionality. It
should not be surprising that the resulting controversy has been
both acrimonious and highly politicized.
Senior Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, charges that the Rehnquist Court
is "narrowing the nation's power" by "siding with the states"
against Congress.' Professor Tom Sargentich echoes that theme in
this symposium with an assertion that there "is an important
difference between a view of the Court as having supremacy in
constitutional interpretation, which results from the need for an
8 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton).
10 304 U.S. 444, 149 n.2 (1938).
11 NOONAN, JR., supra note 2. Judge Noonan's approach focuses on the
convoluted interplay of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Court's creation of "new criteria . . . to limit
lawmaking by Congress." Id. at 4.
2003]
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umpire to reconcile opposing views, and what one commentator
calls the current majority's assumption of 'sovereignty' over
constitutional interpretation."' 2 Scholars who are more skeptical of
the charge that the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence is a
major change in direction pose the power question in more
measured, but no less political, terms.13
None of this should come as a surprise. FDR sought to
"reorganize" the Court because he understood that "constitutional
lawsuits are the stuff of power politics in America."'14 President
George W. Bush understands that as well. Like FDR, he wants to
use "transformative judicial appointments"'15 to change the judicial
power equation he inherited from prior administrations. Hoping to
preserve it, Senate Democrats have mounted a filibuster.' 6 The
system is working exactly as the Framers planned.
The burden of this Essay is to argue that the conventional
wisdom about the Court's resolution of the crisis of 1937 both begs
the question of the Court's jurisdiction to prescribe substantive
rules governing our rights,' and misses the point that history
12 Thomas 0. Sargentich, supra note 6, at 463.
13 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress As Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred
on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001) ("If anything,
as I will argue in this Essay, Congress had been (and still may be) spurring the
Court into action by signaling its indifference to the constitutional fate of its
handiwork."). Id. at 436; Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn
in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, (2001) ("Under either
interpretation, then, something interesting has been taking place at the Supreme
Court, and no one yet has offered a convincing explanation for it."). Id. at 322.
Compare, e.g., Robert A. Destro, "By What Right? ": The Sources and Limits of
Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters "Touching
Religion," 29 IND. L. REV. I (1995).
14 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A
STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 287 (1941).
15 The term is Bruce Ackerman's. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, Transformations,
in WE THE PEOPLE 26 (1998) [hereinafter, ACKERMAN, Transformations]. See,
e.g., Jeanne Cummings, Bush and Conservatives. Nomination Fight Speaks
Volumes-Pickering Judicial Pick Pleases the Right, but Tardy Salvage Effort
May Dismay Them, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at A26.
16 See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Bush's Use of Clout Intensifies Senate Split:
GOP's Boldness Riles Democrats Who Think President Uses Hill as Rubber
Stamp, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2003, at A4.
17 The term "begging the question" is defined as "a taking for granted of
the thing to be proved." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (1989).
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proves the Court unfit to be the sole repository of such a sweeping
power. Part I will argue that the Founders' vision of a "compound"
American republic was lost when the Supreme Court of the United
States used the New Deal controversy over the limits of judicial
review to accomplish one of the most far-reaching power grabs in
the history of the Republic. Part II will discuss how erroneous
assumptions about the prescriptive jurisdiction of the Court lead
lawyers, judges, academics, and politicians to forget that the "crisis
of 1937" was about neither "values" 8  nor "political
participation."' 19 It was about power. They therefore miss
Madison's point: No branch of government can be trusted with
preemptive power to define our rights and duties. Parts III and IV
argue that the Supreme Court's post-New Deal vision of the role of
the political branches in the struggle for human dignity and equal
rights is too weak, and that it has done great harm to the body
politic each time it has attempted to settle a difficult political and
moral issue by striking what appears, at the time, to be a "balance"
between otherwise irreconcilable world-views. From this
perspective, the Rehnquist Court serves the cause of civil rights
each time it reaffirms the "compound" nature of our republic by
forcing a political solution.
The Essay concludes by making three points about the
Realpolitik of footnote four. The first is that it should come as no
surprise that politicians are sometimes either unable or unwilling to
protect the liberty, security, and equal rights of each person. The
Court does not do so either. Footnote four and the text it
accompanies hold that the type and degree of protection owed by
the Justices themselves to the litigants who appear before them
varies in inverse proportion to the Court's perception of their social
status or need.
The second is that when politicians and judges take the oath of
office prescribed by Article VI, each of them undertakes the same
18 Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred
Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske
Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 302 (1995) ("[T]he Carolene Products
Footnote is about values.") (citations omitted).
19 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 77 (1980) ("participation ... either in the political processes by which
values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation
those processes have reached .... ).
2003]
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sacred duty to the "whole person" embodied in each individual20
subject to their political jurisdiction. The oath-like the
Constitution they are sworn to "support and defend"-is neither
selective nor abstract. Its stated goal is the equal protection of the
whole person and citizen, not disembodied "values," abstract
liberties, or factional interests.
The third point follows from the first two. Like the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, FDR attacked the Court because he
believed that it had taken sides in what he called the "unending
struggle between those who would preserve this original broad
understanding of the Constitution as a layman's instrument of
government and those who would shrivel the Constitution into a
lawyer's contract.",2 1 Until the Court accepts the proposition that a
judiciary perceived for any reason to be biased or otherwise
"activist" contributes to the destruction of the fabric of republican
self-government envisioned in Federalist 51, it is pointless to
decry the increasingly vitriolic tenor of the rhetoric surrounding
judicial decisions and nominations. "In the compound republic of
America," it is the threat that "different governments will control
each other" that provides the guarantee that "at the same time...
each will be controlled by itself."
I. RECAPTURING THE VISION: POLITICAL JURISDICTION IN A
"COMPOUND REPUBLIC"
Few topics have been more controversial in the history of our
compound republic than the nature and extent of the federal
government's power to make laws that have the purpose and effect
of preempting state institutions or policies. The first such
controversy occurred at the Constitutional Convention itself, where
the Antifederalists sought explicit guarantees that federal power
20 The language of the Fourth Amendment captures the tangible
manifestations of this concept when it refers to the right of each individual "to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Read as an organic whole, the Constitution provides for the protection and
"security" of the person in all walks and activities of life: in trade and
commerce, in the arts, in matters of religion and spiritual development, in the
resolution of disputes, and in matters of local and national self-government.
21 Id. at 377, quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day,
Sept. 17, 1937, cited infra note 56.
380 [Vol. 12
THE REALPOLITIK OF FOOTNOTE FOUR
would not be utilized to preempt important state laws, institutions,
and values. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights reflects those
concerns. It states:
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time
of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order
to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as
extending the ground of public confidence in the Government,
will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institutions.
RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two
thirds of both Houses concurring, that the following Articles be
proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as
amendments to the Constitution of the United States .... 22
22 U.S. CONST. pmbl., bill of rights. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights was
agreed to by the Senate on Tuesday, September 8, 1789. Journal of the Senate
(Tuesday, Sept. 8, 1789) at 78. The image can be obtained online through the
Library of Congress at: http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/
uc004829.jpg (last visited July 25, 2003). The Preamble itself is reproduced
online at http://www.archives.gov/exhibithall/charters of freedom/
billof rights/preamble.html (National Archives' Charter of Freedom Exhibit)
(last visited July 5, 2003). In full, the Preamble provides as follows:
Congress of the United States begun and held at the City of New-
York, on Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven
hundred and eighty nine.
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of
their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and
restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of
public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent
ends of its institution.
RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both
Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the
Legislatures of the several States, as amendments to the Constitution
of the United States, all, or any of which Articles, when ratified by
three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and
purposes, as part of the said Constitution; viz.
ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by




The text and structure of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and
Fourteenth Amendment underscore the point. The United States
Reports are filled with disputes in which the ultimate question is
the balance to be struck between federal and state jurisdiction to
prescribe.
Controversies over the power of judicial review center on
precisely the same issue. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court
asserted the unexceptionable proposition that Congressional
jurisdiction to prescribe is limited by the Constitution that creates
it, and that laws exceeding those limits are a nullity.23 Executive
acts, 24 federal and state judicial decrees,25 and state laws26 are
subject to the same J urisdictional restraints. So too are the
decisions of the Court.
The concept that lies at the core of these disputes-jurisdiction
to prescribe-provides a useful framework in which to discuss not
only the Rehnquist Court's approach to federalism and separation
of powers, but also its conception of the nature and scope of the
power of judicial review. Defined as the power of a sovereign "to
make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of
persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by
legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination of a court,, 28 federal jurisdiction to
prescribe thus includes not only the legislative powers of Congress,
23 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
24 E.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
25 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
26 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819).
27 See Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), rev'g Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16. Pet.) 1
(1842). See generally Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 11 J. LAW & RELIGION 355 (1994-95).
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40 1(a) (1986).
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but also any prescriptive powers claimed by the President under
Article 11,29 or by the Court under Article III.
The literature on these topics is voluminous, and the lack of
clarity in the Rehnquist Court's federalism cases exacerbates the
problem.30 Dissecting either body of literature is not, as Professor
Roger Hartley puts it, a task "for the faint of heart."3 ' Thankfully,
it is both unnecessary and premature to attempt that particular task
in this Essay. Sovereign immunity, federalism, and separation of
powers are structural issues derived from a far more fundamental
issue: institutional competence.
Advocates of the post-New Deal allocation of power between
the Congress and the Court have long accepted the proposition that
the Court's "power of interpretation functions as the power to
revise, restate, [and] remake the constitution. 3 2 As long as the
Court was striking the proper political balance in cases involving
civil and political rights, and was willing to defer to Congress in all
matters arguably within its jurisdiction, it was possible to imagine
that the scope of the power claimed by the judiciary under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was limited by the
countervailing powers of Congress under Sections 1 and 5 33and
Articles I and IV.
34
Now that the Rehnquist Court has given notice that exercises
of Congressional power must be defended ab initio,35 and has
rejected the argument that controversies over the reserved powers
of the States are nonjusticiable,36 advocates of the proposition that
"the ideals of the [New Deal's] victorious activist Democracy
[could also] serve as a primary foundation for constitutional rights
29 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
30 Compare, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), with
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996), with Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
31 Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public Entities
After Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 43 (2001).
32 NOONAN, supra note 2, at 7; see also infra text accompanying note 142.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
34 U.S. CONST. arts. I, IV.
35 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
36 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-88 (1992) (holding
that states may challenge, on federalism grounds, the constitutionality of statutes
their officials supported in Congress).
2003] 383
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in the United States" 37 are justifiably fearful that the Court will,
once again, put its power claims before its duty to support and
defend the Constitution. Echoing the words of then-Attorney
General Robert Jackson after the crisis of 1937,38 Judge Noonan
makes the case that "[t]he court's struggle for supremacy over all
branches of government" has resumed, "and must be resisted
again" 39 lest "the Supreme Court become[] the supreme authority
in the land.",
40
If one assumes the validity of the post-1937 power structure,
the reasoning of its separation of powers and federalism cases does
seem to lead inexorably to a conclusion that "the Constitution is
what the judges say it is."41 If, by contrast, one begins with the
traditional assumption that all claims to prescriptive jurisdiction
must be proved, the Rehnquist Court's federalism and separation
of powers jurisprudence leads to precisely the opposite
conclusion.42 The courts have only the power the Constitution
gives specifically to them, minus the powers allocated to others.43
There is no indication in the cases that the Court has any
interest in cutting back on otherwise legitimate exercises of
Congressional jurisdiction to prescribe rules for the national
economy or that it wants to limit the exercise of express
Congressional authority to guarantee equality before the law. 4Nor
has the Court indicated any reservation about the authority of the
37 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
715(1985).
38 
JACKSON, supra note 14.
39 NOONAN, supra note 2, at 7.
4 0 NOONAN, supra note 2, at 7.
41 Speech by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, at Elmira, New York
(1907), in THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, at 143
(David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds.) (1973) (citation omitted).
42 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining
the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001) ("For several years
now, the Supreme Court has disquieted observers and commentators by
reasserting the presence of constitutional limitations on national power resulting
from the federal structure of the American political system."). Id. at 477.
43 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
44 See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972
(2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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United States to bring enforcement actions for money damages
against the States. 45 The Justices of the Rehnquist Court who most
often vote with the majority have made it clear, however, that they
have serious questions concerning the constitutionality of the
power the Court reserved for itse/f after the crisis of 1937.46
While it "would be impossible and perhaps undesirable" for
the Court "to return to the assumptions of pre-1937 doctrine
4 7
concerning the powers of Congress and the States, it would be
perfectly consistent with the post- 193 7 political settlement for the
Court to reexamine the nature and extent of its own claims to
prescriptive jurisdiction48 under Article III and the Due Process
45 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (conferring jurisdiction over suits against the
states in specified cases). West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4
(1987) ("States retain no sovereign immunity as against the Federal
Government."). Accord Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001)
(noting that the Court's holding had no impact on the ability of the United States
to enforce the ADA in suits for money damages); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
755-56 (1999) (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329
(1934), and observing that a "suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a
State in the name of the United States ... differs in kind from the suit of an
individual"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (noting that
"[t]he Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State" as a
method of "ensuring the States' compliance with federal law"). United States v.
Miss. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 321 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2003).
46 See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 (2002) (Scalia & Thomas,
JJ., dissenting) (specifically taking aim at the Court's "substantive due process"
rationale); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (dissenting opinions of
Rehnquist, C.J., and of Scalia, Thomas, & Kennedy, JJ.); Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703 (2000) (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Accord, Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.; Scalia,
O'Connor, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Cf City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye
Cmty. Hope Found., 123 S. Ct. 1389, 1397 (2003) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring) (criticizing the substantive due process arguments made by the
respondents).
47 Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 33-34 (J.A. Dorn ed., 1987).
48 See supra text accompanying note 29. Section 401 of the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES distinguishes
three categories of political jurisdiction:
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to the
activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in
things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by
administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court;
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Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 49 Judge Noonan
is therefore correct when he urges that the analytical focus of this
debate over the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court should center
"on the institution rather than the individuals within it."50 We must
consider not only what the Court is doing, but also "by what right"
it claims the authority to do so.51 The Court's inability to answer
that question is what led FDR to propose his court reorganization
plan in the first place.
A. A "Constitutional Equilibrium"
This analysis begins with a simple question: To whom does the
Constitution entrust the power to define and protect the rights and
liberties of the People? Federalist 51 explains that the Framers had
such an abiding respect for both individuals and the communities
in which they exercise the powers of self-government that they
were unwilling to lodge that power in a single location.
In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided
among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself.
(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the
process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in
criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the
proceedings;
(c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., to induce or compel compliance or to
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the
courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other
nonjudicial action.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 28.
49 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 264 n.37 (1970); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds).
5o NOONAN, supra, note 2, at 8.
5' Louis LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME
COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975).
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Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to
guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of
citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the
rights of the minority will be insecure. 52
Though neither "federalism" nor "separation of powers" is
mentioned in the text of the Constitution, 53 they are the result of a
functional distribution of political power that creates one nation,
and divides the power to govern it (political jurisdiction) between
and among the several States and the federal government. The'
federal government and the states share an equal, but limited,
dignity and sovereignty not because of their inherent
characteristics as governments, or because they inherited those
qualities from the British Crown, but because the power they
exercise within their respective spheres of political jurisdiction is
delegated by the ultimate sovereign: the "People of the United
States." The result is a dynamic political system that permits
shifting factions and coalitions to challenge accretions of power
that threaten individual rights and local self-government, or stand
in the way of needed legal and cultural change.54
52 THE FEDERALIST 5 1, supra note 1.
53 Compare, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43 (1975 & Supp. 2002), stating:
In the government of this state, except in the instances in this
Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the
legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them;
the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a
government of laws and not of men.
with ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. art. 2 § I (West 2003) ("The legislative, executive
and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly
belonging to another."); Mich. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The powers of government
are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person
exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to
another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution."). Id.
54 Madison, who, as "Publius," wrote eloquently of the merits of both
separation of powers and federalism in The Federalist, did not embrace either
concept at the Constitutional Convention. He wrote, and strongly supported, the
"Virginia Plan," which called for proportional representation in both houses of
2003] 387
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Like FDR and others before them,55 the Rehnquist Court's
critics are complaining that the majority is reading the Constitution
in a manner at odds with the way it is written.56 This, however, is
neither a new phenomenon nor a new complaint. The Court has
Congress, a Congressional negative on state laws (which would have had the
impact of reducing the States to the status of counties), and judicial participation
with the Executive in a Council of Revision. Charles F. Hobson, The Negative
on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican
Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q 215, 226 (1979). Even after the Convention he
remained a nationalist, who strongly believed only the Congress of an extended
republic would embrace a sufficient multitude of diverse factional interests to
assure the formation of "disinterested majorities, strongly disposed to seek the
general good of the society." Id. at 232. In his view, a wide-open and robust
political "marketplace of ideas" and factions was itself an essential structural
protection for individual liberties.
The Antifederalists, by contrast, just as emphatically did not want a
"national" government. Mirroring their distrust of the proposed federal
government was their faith in representatives known to and trusted by their local
communities. To them, the victory in the American Revolution meant not so
much the big chance to become a wealthy world power, but rather the
opportunity to achieve a genuinely republican polity, far from the greed, lust for
power, and tyranny that had generally characterized human society. It meant
"retaining as much as possible the vitality of local government where rulers and
ruled could see, know and understand each other." R. KETCHAM, Antifederalist
Political Thought, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES 17 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). Oliver Ellsworth's report
on the compromise is well known: "the government contemplated by the
Convention was to have a mixed character-'partly federal and partly
national."' Id.
For an extended discussion of these topics see Robert A. Destro, The
Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J. LAW & RELIGION 355, 395-
397 (1995).
55 See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges,
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
962 (2002) (discussing political opposition to unpopular judges and decisions).
56 In an address on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the
Constitution, FDR complained that "nearly every attempt to meet those demands
for social and economic betterment has been jeopardized or actually forbidden by
those who have sought to read into the Constitution language which the framers
refused to write into the Constitution." FDR's Address on Constitution Day,
(Sept. 17, 1937) (emphasis added), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (1938-1950) at 366, available at Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library and Museum, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/tmirhsee.html
(last visited July 5, 2003).
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been using the Due Process Clause as a license to rewrite the
Constitution since Dred Scott v. Sandford.57
The charges of judicial activism by critics of the Rehnquist
Court have nothing to do with the Constitution as an organic
whole, or with the specifics of key provisions like the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue in this controversy
is the Court's apparent rejection of a series of assumptions about
the allocation of political power and the role of the judiciary
embodied in the post-1937 jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court.
All parties to the current debate agree that the original
Constitution gave the United States the power to regulate matters
relating to the national economy, national citizenship and
immigration, foreign affairs, operational federalism, and defense.
5 8
All will also readily agree that all powers not delegated to the
federal government were reserved to the States and the People,
respectively. 59 There is also widespread agreement that the Civil
War Amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, gave Congress the
power to ensure that the States themselves would respect the
liberty and equality guaranteed by the Constitution, federal
statutes, and their own laws.
The differences among the contending factions in the "New
Federalism" debate arise at the "margins" of political jurisdiction;
that is, at the point where there may be "concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain." 60 It is within this boundary
area, aptly described by the late Justice Robert Jackson in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer as a "zone of twilight," where
the competing claims of political jurisdiction made by the federal
57 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Professor David Currie has written that
Dred Scott "was at least very possibly the first application of substantive due
process in the Supreme Court, and in a sense, the original precedent for Lochner
v. New York and Roe v. Wade." David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal Powers, 1836-64, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695,
735-36, and nn.255-64.
58 U.S. CONST. art. IV.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
60 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). The boundary at issue in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
was the area of competence "in which [the President] and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." Id.
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government, its branches, and the States, respectively, must be
worked out in practice. 6 1 The debate over the Rehnquist Court's
"New Federalism" takes place within this "zone of twilight," and
its intensity reflects the shared commitment of each participant in
the debate "to uard one part of the society against the injustice of
the other part."
Make no mistake: there are boundaries. Within them, the
distribution of power is both "certain" and, with limited
exceptions, 6 3 exclusive. The politics of both separation of powers
and federalism-including this debate-occur at the margins,
where legitimate claims can be made by rival claimants to power.
The result is a "zone of twilight" that is, in practice, a dynamic
political arena crowded with factions whose interests drive them to
exploit the "inertia, indifference or quiescence [that] may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent ... responsibility.
'" 64
The strictures of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 65 the ability
to prosecute rapists under the Violence Against Women Act, 66 the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,67 and the push to recognize
private rights of action for damages against States as a means of
enforcing salutary laws like the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,68 the Americans with Disabilities Act, 69 and the
Family and Medical Leave Act were efforts to test-and to set-
jurisdictional boundaries. Each of these statutes represents an
attempt by Congress to expand the scope of federal regulatory
power into an area where the text and structure of the Constitution
create uncertainties concerning the location of the jurisdictional
6 1 id.
62 id.
63 Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) with,
e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (reserving to the States control over interstate
shipment of intoxicating liquors).
64 Youngstown, 343 U.S. 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
65 Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
66 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2000)
("All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes
of violence motivated by gender.").
6' 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
68 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
6942 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
70 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2003).
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boundary. It should, therefore, be neither surprising nor alarming
that every assertion of prescriptive power in an area of
"uncertainty" will be resisted. That is the inevitable result of what
Justice Jackson called "the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system." 
71
Before 1936, the power equation had tipped decisively in the
direction of the judicial branch, which used the power of judicial
review to thwart otherwise legitimate exercise of legislative
authority. Roosevelt's attack on the Court was an attempt to restore
the equilibrium the Founders envisioned between Congress and the
Court. It succeeded. Viewed structurally, the decisions in United
72 73States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison, Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents74, and Nevada v. Hibbs75 can also be read as
attempts to restore equilibrium in the ongoing political struggle to
ensure the health, safety, and equal protection of the American
people.
Perspective counts for quite a lot in a political struggle. To
academics and judges, cases like Lopez, Kimel, Morrison, and
Hibbs are about the allocation of power in the federal system. To
the factions that pressed for the adoption of these statutes, they are
symbolic affirmations that their work remains incomplete. For the
individuals involved, they are searing experiences that will leave
scars for a lifetime.
76
71 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
72 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7' 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
74 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
" 123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003).
76 To young Alonzo Lopez, the constitutionality of the Gun Free School
Zones Act was not a mere symbol. If Congress had the authority to criminalize
his conduct, he could be prosecuted twice for the same act: once by the federal
government, and once by the State of Texas. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein,
Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541 (2002).
For college freshman, Christy Brzonkala, and her alleged rapist, football player
Antonio Morrison, the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act
was no academic matter. Both she and Mr. Morrison learned the hard way that
every "claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution," Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J.,
concurring), and that the significant personal and political stake each had in the
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Each of these cases should be a stark reminder of the wisdom
of Jackson's observation that "[i]n this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law. ' 77 They also remind us that premature attempts to fix the
boundaries in a way that upsets the equilibrium between and
among the branches and between the federal government and the
States have significant consequences for us all.
B. Transcending the Politics of the New Deal
Post-New Deal discussions of the allocation of political
jurisdiction assume that the Constitution assigns primary
responsibility for defining and protecting our rights as individuals
to the "Judicial Department" of the federal government.7 ' Two
related subsidiary propositions flow from this assumption. One is
that the obligation of the judicial department to render judgment in
cases of alleged abuse or usurpation of power is (or should be)
inversely proportional to the political power the litigant can
command in the public arena.7 9 The other is that the allocation of
power between the federal government and the states is
qualitatively different for constitutional purposes than, for
example, the relationship between the legislative and judicial
branches.
80
These assumptions are so thoroughly rooted in the fabric of
contemporary constitutional law that they function as the
unconscious starting point for most academic discussions of
outcome does not seem to account for much when "what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system." Id.
77 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
78 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866, 873 (1992), the
plurality opinion observed that we are to accept the Court's conceptions of our
liberties whenever the "principled character [of a given ruling] is sufficiently
plausible to be accepted by the Nation," even if the text of the Constitution says
otherwise. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
79 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 9, 16 (1978) (role of courts should be limited to
protection of the politically powerless).
80 See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts was
unconstitutional).
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separation of powers and federalism.81 Because each is rooted in
either the New Deal's partisan vision of the political order, or in
the Court's institutional reaction to it, it is also assumed that any
rigorous attempt to "unpack" the post-New Deal allocation of
political jurisdiction between Congress and the Court rests upon an
equally partisan conception of the political order. The "question
presented" in this symposium is a case-in-point: Is the Supreme
Court Undoing the New Deal?
1. What Does the "New Deal" Have to do with the Allocation of
Political Jurisdiction Under the Amended Constitution?
If the text and structure of the Constitution is the starting point
for analysis, the short answer to this question is "nothing." The
Constitution is a framework for the allocation of power and the
organization of government. The operational allocation of political
jurisdiction between and among the branches and between the
federal government and the States-described by Justice Robert
Jackson as the "actual test of power"-is likely to depend most
heavily on the nature of the subject matter and "on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law."
82
The confrontation between Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR)
and the Supreme Court after the 1936 election can be viewed as a
"constitutional moment" of the sort described by Professor Bruce
Ackerman, 83 or simply one of several "dramatic episodes of
alteration in the institutional and political realities of U.S. public
life.",84 No matter how it is viewed, however, it stands as one of the
81 See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 6. ("Because the Supreme Court had not
yet decided Marbury v. Madison and asserted its prerogative as interpreter of the
Constitution, victory at the polls-the Jeffersonian Republicans' overwhelming
triumph in the 1800 elections-supplied all of the authority Jefferson needed to
negotiate and ratify the Louisiana treaty."). Id. at 411.
82 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
83 See ACKERMAN Foundations, supra n.5 (distinguishing periods of
ordinary lawmaking from "constitutional moments" in which the political
branches, acting in furtherance of a popular political mandate, effect a major
reallocation in the operational distribution of power).
84 Thomas 0. Sargentich, supra note 6, at 515. See also Knowles, supra
note 6; Pope, supra note 6.
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most pristine examples of how "the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables" provide strong incentives for the
branches of the federal government and the States to use the
structural allocation of power embedded in the constitutional
framework as launching pads for dramatic steps designed to further
their respective policy agendas.
There are many such cases. Some are dramatic, like the
Constitutional Convention, the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
Louisiana Purchase, the Court's assertions of power in Marbury v.
Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland, the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, Dred Scott v. Sandford and the Civil War, and the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Others are more
"transitional," such as the growth and development of the theory
and practice of substantive due process during the period between
1879 and 1989.85 What each has in common with the others is that
it represents a point in political time where branches of the federal
government or the States marked out the boundaries of their
respective political jurisdiction.
86
The New Deal was no exception. At bottom, it was, and
remains, a political philosophy that embodies a preference for a
"national" government that will defend and foster the interests of
its constituent factions. Marking the boundaries of federal power
was one of the most important items on the agenda of the FDR's
political coalition. After winning the landslide election of 1936, the
New Deal coalition consolidated its hold on federal power by
creating federal programs; it strengthened the hand of the President
by creating independent agencies and giving them the power to
85 See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). See generally Janet S.
Lindgren, Beyond Cases: Reconsidering Judicial Review, 1983 Wis. L. REV.
583 (1983); Kyle T. Murray, Note, Looking for Lochner in All the Wrong
Places: The Iowa Supreme Court and Substantive Due Process Review, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1141 (1999).
86 The same phenomenon occurs at the state level. Recent cases include
legislative/judicial wrangling over school finance reforms and levels, see, for
example, DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E. 2d 529 (2002) (summarizing the
controversy), and popular rejection of judicial attempts to extend the status of
"marriage" to same-sex unions. See generally William C. Duncan, Whither
Marriage in the Law? 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 119 (2002-03); Josephine Ross,
Sex, Marriage and History: Analyzing the Continued Resistance to Same-Sex
Marriage, 55 SMU L. Rev. 1657 (2002).
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legislate; and it successfully used the threat of Court-packing to
defend its legacy against judicial attack. Because the Court
"subdued the rebellion against their constitutional dogma by
joining it," 87 the preference for national governance embedded in
New Deal political philosophy became so inextricably intertwined
in the fabric of the Court's post-1937 jurisprudence that it can
rightly be viewed as one of the most important parts of the political
legacy of FDR's New Deal coalition.
Since it comes as no surprise that a majority of the members
of the Rehnquist Court do not share the political philosophy of the
New Deal, and President Roosevelt died in 1945, the question is
not whether the Supreme Court is "undoing the New Deal," but
rather why anyone should care. If we are to give that important
question the attention it deserves, then we must ask another
question: What does the legacy of the New Deal have to do with
the powers of the United States Supreme Court?
2. The New Deal and the "Checking Functions" of Federalism &
Separation of Powers
In order to explore the impact of the New Deal on the
Supreme Court's understanding of its own power, we must first
consider the means by which President Roosevelt sought to shield
the New Deal's policies from judicial attack. His political agenda
required that Congress take control of the national economy, that it
enact programs to end the Great Depression, that the President be
given the authority to regulate key sectors of the economy, and that
Congress use its regulatory and fiscal powers to address significant
social problems. FDR knew that federal powers, including his own,
were limited; that powerful political and economic factions were
arrayed against him, and that the Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence made litigation a viable means for his opponents to
continue the political battle for control of the economy.
Given its political context, the "Court-Packing Plan" was both
a brilliant political maneuver and a legislative disaster.88 Article III
87 JACKSON, supra note 14, at vi.
88 The political context in which the Court-packing plan arose is recounted
in many books and articles. Professor Stephen 0. Kline's 1999 article provides
an excellent overview. Stephen 0. Kline, Revisiting FDR's Court Packing Plan:
Are the Current Attacks on Judicial Independence So Bad?, 30 MCGEORGE L.
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creates "one supreme Court,"89 but vests control of its size and
composition in the political branches. 90 When Roosevelt proposed
that the size of the Court be increased, he attempted to utilize those
powers in the way the Framers intended: as a political tool for
"checking" the power of the Judicial Branch. It was as stark a
warning as has ever been delivered to-and received by-the
Court. The message delivered was clear: the Court's power "to say
what the law is" is limited by the very structural devices we are
debating in this symposium: separation of powers and federalism.
Though FDR lost the Court-packing battle, he won the war
with the Court over the power of the federal government to
regulate the national economy. Fifty-eight years would elapse
between the Court's acknowledgement that the Constitution
confers the power and duty of regulating the national economy on
REV. 863 (1999). Professor Kline reports that, during 1936, "more than 100
separate proposals were introduced to alter the balance of power between the
Court and the political branches." Id. at 901. These included proposals to change
the size of the Court, to increase the number of votes required to hold legislation
unconstitutional, and to institute better retirement plans for aged Justices. Id. at
901-02. There were proposals to amend the Constitution as well. See also G.
Edward White, The "Constitutional Revolution" as a Crisis in Adaptivity, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1997).
89 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
90 The Constitution assumes that the Supreme Court of the United States
will have a Chief Justice, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("When the President of
the United States is tried [after impeachment], the Chief Justice shall preside."),
and an unspecified number of Associate Justices, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(conferring upon the President the power to "nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate ... appoint ... Judges of the supreme [sic]
Court").
President Roosevelt's Message to Congress containing his
"Recommendation to Reorganize the Judicial Branch of the Federal
Government" observed that:
In almost every decade since 1789 changes have been made by the
Congress whereby the numbers of judges and the duties of judges in
the Federal courts have been altered in one way or another. The
Supreme Court was established with 6 members in 1789; it was
reduced to 5 in 1801; it was increased to 7 in 1807; it was increased
to 9 in 1837; it was increased to 10 in 1863; it was reduced to 7 in
1866; it was increased to 9 in 1869.
H.R. Doc. No. 75-142, at 2 (1937).
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Congress,91 and its refusal to accept the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses as the jurisdictional basis for the Gun-Free
School Zones Act.
92
The title of the symposium assumes, wrongly in my view, that
the Rehnquist Court has taken aim at the New Deal itself, rather
the arguments of those who would extend the Court's post-1937
deference to the powers of Congress to the limits of its logic. 93 A
more balanced approach, in my view, is to view the Court's use of
the concept of due process to hamper otherwise-legitimate
legislative policy making, Roosevelt's response in the Court-
packing plan, its rejection by key members of Congress, the
Court's 1937 about face, and the Rehnquist Court's refusal to defer
to a Congressional attempt to federalize possession of guns in
school zones as a case study of how Madison's observations in
91 See Va. Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (upholding
the Railway Labor Act of 1934):
Even though Congress, in the choice of means to effect a permissible
regulation of commerce, must conform to due process, it is evident
that where, as here, the means chosen are appropriate to the
permissible end, there is little scope for the operation of the due
process clause.... And the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth...
is not a guarantee of untrammeled freedom of action and of contract.
In the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, Congress can
subject both to restraints not shown to be unreasonable.
Id. at 558 (citations omitted). Accord, Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440
(1937) (upholding revisions to the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act), revg,
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); West Coast
Hotel Co v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause attack on the Washington State minimum wage law for
women and minors). See 1913 Wash. Laws ch. 174, p. 603.
92 Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000),
held unconstitutional in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (prohibiting
"any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone").
93 See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). In
McCarter, Justice Holmes stated:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme.
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy
which are other than those on which the particular right is founded,





Federalist 10 and 51 apply in the extended, "real-time"
environment of constitutional politics.
"A double security arises to the rights of the people," wrote
Madison, when contending political factions coalesce into a critical
mass willing to confront accretions of power viewed as inimical to
the common good.94 Unlike the dissenters in Seminole Tribe95 and
Alden, 96 Roosevelt understood the practical and political limits of
asserting federal power over the States as States.97 His most
important legacy, Social Security, included an explicit exemption
for what are now hugely successful state public employee
retirement systems. When Florida and Maine asserted their
immunity against private suits in Seminole Tribe, Kimel, and
Alden, respectively, they illustrated the ways in which the structure
of the Constitution makes it possible for the "different
governments [to] control each other,"99 and when Congress refused
to vote on Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, it illustrated the ways
in which a robust understanding of separation of powers ensures
94 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
95 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
96 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
97 Cf James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original
Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 558-59 (1994) Professor
Pfander argues that the Original Jurisdiction Clause "overrode states' sovereign
immunity under the law of nations when [the Framers] included state-party
'cases' in an effort to assure the existence of an original federal docket for
federal question claims against the states." Id. at 653. In his view, the Original
Jurisdiction Clause was "at the center of the framers' plan to secure the effective
enforcement of federal law against the states," and that Congress should
consider its implications, along with the limitations imposed by the Eleventh
Amendment, when it considers the means at its disposal for "the enforcement of
federal law against the states in their sovereign or collective capacity." Id. at
558-59.
98 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 7701 (2003). See
generally Pamela Yip, Teachers Find Social Security Law Loophole, KNIGHT-
RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS: DALLAS MORNING NEWS PERSONAL FINANCE
COLUMN (June 10, 2002).
99 THE FEDERALIST 51, supra, note I at 164. See generally William E.
Thro, Immunity or Intellectual Property: The Constitutionality of Forcing the
States to Choose, 173 WEST'S EDU. L. REP. 17 (2003).
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that "at the same time [,] ... each [government] will be controlled
by itself."' 00
I. JUDICIAL "ACTIVISM": FEDERALISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS &
THE REHNQUIST COURT
A. The Meaning of "Judicial Activism"
Charges that the Rehnquist Court has become a bastion of
"conservative activism" are a relatively recent political
phenomenon. 10 In order to understand them fully, it will be
necessary briefly to unpack the meaning of the term "judicial
activism."
100 THE FEDERALIST 51, supra, note 1 at 164. Roosevelt also learned, first-
hand, the political risks of an attack on the power of judicial review. Professors
Prakash and Yoo have suggested that, in their zeal to attack the Court's
federalism decisions, some academic commentators also attack the power of
judicial review. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1465
(2001). Prakash and Yoo suggest that Professor Larry Kramer's rejection of
judicial review of federalism is based on the idea that "the Constitution requires
no judicial review at all." Id. Professor Kramer's words appear to support their
view: "Given their understanding of judicial review, no one in the Founding
generation would have imagined that courts could or should play a prominent
role in defining the limits of federal power. And no one did." Id. Professor
Kramer's view is at odds with the Court's record in the field of individual rights.
Viewed structurally, its individual rights decisions unquestionably "defin[e] the
limits of federal power." Id. The Incorporation Doctrine was an enormous
expansion of federal power, see Destro, supra note 13; and the Court's holdings
concerning the application of the Bill of Rights in federal question cases impose
express limits on its exercise. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
101 A search of Westlaw reveals that until 1991, criticism of the Rehnquist
Court for "judicial activism" was practically nonexistent. The first reference that
I could find in that database was a warning that "[n]ew Justices in the Rehnquist
mold could help comprise an activist Court seeking to further conservative
political values." Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Constitutional Perils-Real and
Otherwise, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1011-12 (1984) (footnote omitted) (reviewing
NORMAN DORSEN, OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS-THE ACLU REPORT ON CIVIL
LIBERTIES TODAY (1984)). See also William H. Erickson & William D.
Neighbors, Pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court Relating to the
Criminal Law Field.- 1983-1984, 103 F.R.D. 187 (1984) (noting "that the present
court, though more conservative, continues the activist role of its predecessor").
Id. at 191.
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To a judicial conservative, such as Justice Antonin Scalia,
"our Constitution . . . is a practical and pragmatic charter of
government-a framework for the allocation of power, not a
'living' document, the meaning of which changes over time." 10 2 In
this view, the role of the judge or Justice is to determine the locus
of the power allocation based on the Constitution as written.
Judicial "activism" is therefore any judicial act-whether
deferential or assertive-that does not find support in the text and
structure of the Constitution, when read in light of the history that
led to the adoption of the specific text in question.
To judicial liberals, such as Earl Warren or William Brennan,
the question of judicial activism cannot be separated from the role
the Constitution assigns to the judiciary. In their view, "the issue
on judicial review was not reasonableness but rightness. If the law
was contrary to their own conception of what the Constitution
demanded, it did not matter that a reasonable legislator might reach
102 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 134 (1997). The text
from which this quotation was excerpted reads as follows:
The American people have been converted to believe in The Living
Constitution, a 'morphing' document that means, from age to age,
what it ought to mean. And with that conversion has inevitably come
the new phenomenon of selecting and confirming federal judges, at
all levels, on the basis of their views regarding a whole series of
proposals for constitutional evolution. If the courts are free to write
the Constitution anew they will, by God, write it the way the majority
wants; the appointment and confirmation process will see to that.
This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights, whose meaning will
be committed to the very body it was meant to protect against: the
majority. By trying to make the Constitution do everything that needs
doing from age to age, we shall have caused it to do nothing at all.
Id. at 47. See also Alice Koskela, Scalia Shows Textualists Have a Sense of
Humor, 43 ADVOCATE 31 (2000):
They call themselves believers in the 'living Constitution,' Scalia said
of his philosophical foes. 'Now isn't that great packaging? Where
does that leave me? Oh, Scalia, he wants to defend the dead
Constitution.' Scalia, who said he prefers the term 'enduring
Constitution,' to describe the document he holds sacred, insisted that
his interpretation is the only one that makes sense. 'I am applying
principles as they were adopted-I give words the meaning they had.
.when they were adopted,' he said."
Id. at 31.
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the opposite conclusion."' 10 3 Judicial activism is therefore any act
or omission by the judiciary that is inconsistent with a right result
in the case before them. 10 4 Professor Bernard Schwartz has
observed.
The crucial question in constitutional cases,
according to Justice Frankfurter, the leading post-
Holmes advocate of judicial restraint, was: '[W]ho
is to judge' . . . 'Is it the Court or Congress? Indeed,
more accurately, must not the Court put on the
sackcloth and ashes of deferring humility in order to
determine whether the judgment that Congress
exercise[s] . . . is so outside the limits of a
supportable judgment by those who have the
primary duty of judgment as to constitute that
disregard of reason which we call an arbitrary
judgment[?]
' 10 5
To Chief Justice Warren and his supporters, Frankfurter posed
the wrong questions. Their view was well expressed by Justice
Black, replying to a letter asking whether the Court should defer to
congressional judgment on constitutional issues.
The question just does not make sense to me. This is
because if the Court must 'defer' to the legislative
judgment about whether a statute is constitutional,
then the Court must yield its responsibility to another
body that does not possess that responsibility .... I
think it is the business and the supreme responsibility
of the Court to hold a law unconstitutional if it
believes that the law is unconstitutional, without
'deference' to anybody or any institution . . . . I
103 Bernard Schwartz, "Brennan vs. Rehnquist"--Mirror Images in
Constitutional Construction, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 213, 217 (1994).
104 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 138-39, 142-143 (2000)
(Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, & Souter, JJ., dissenting); id., at 143-44 (Ginsburg
& Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(Part I of opinion of O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, and of
Blackmun, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
105 Schwartz, supra note 104, at 216 (citations omitted).
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believe it is the duty of the Court to show 'deference'
to the Constitution only.'
0 6
If viewed as a question of "deference" alone, both sides are
correct. When the Constitution gives Congress jurisdiction to
prescribe rules to govern a particular geographic or subject-matter
area and does not otherwise limit its discretion, Justice Frankfurter
has the better part of the argument. The courts must defer when the
act under scrutiny is within the political jurisdiction of the entity
whose power is questioned. To do otherwise is to
unconstitutionally invade the powers granted or reserved to
Congress, the President, or the States. To the extent that the issue
is one of power derived from or reserved by the Constitution,
Justice Black is also correct. "Deferring humility" is
unconstitutional if a fair reading of the Constitution leads to a
conclusion that a State or any branch of the federal government has
exceeded the scope of its authority.
The only way to make sense of the muddle is to undertake an
analysis of the power allocations made by the Constitution. In this
case, "deference" is not an issue. The power claimant either has
political jurisdiction, or it does not. The "rightness" of a given
result is equally irrelevant at this stage. It becomes relevant if, and
only if, the entity making the rule has the jurisdiction to prescribe
the "right" rule in the first instance.
B. The Function of the "Standard of Review"
1. The Judicial Role
Since "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding,"' 1 7 this section begins with Alexander Hamilton's
observation that "the courts were designed to be an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority."'1 8 This intermediate role, according to Hamilton, was to
be governed by a clear understanding on the part of the judges that
106 Schwartz, supra note 104, at 216 (citations omitted).
107 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
108 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton).
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"[a] constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by [them], as a
fundamental law."1
0 9
Federalist 51 explains that the first principle of power
allocation in our "compound republic" is that "the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments:" federal and state."10 The baseline of federal
jurisdiction to prescribe was established in 1787 and adjusted
periodically thereafter by the Bill of Rights and subsequent
amendments. State jurisdiction to prescribe was reserved
simultaneously, and has been adjusted over time by the same
sequence of amendments.
The power of judicial review arose under, and is limited by,
the same acts of formal ratification. The "portion [of jurisdiction to
prescribe] allotted to [the federal government was] subdivided
among distinct and separate departments.""' Jurisdiction to
prescribe rules of conduct was reserved to the political branches;
1 2
divided to ensure oversight; 113 and subjected to specific limitations
in a number of cases where factional self-interest would likely
produce outcomes inconsistent with national, regional, or
individual interests.' 14 So understood, the Court's claim that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is"'115 does not "by any means suppose a
superiority of the judicial to the legislative power."' As a
structural device, judicial review "only supposes that the power of
the people is superior to both[,]" ' 1 7 and ensures that a forum is
available for the resolution of cases and controversies arising under
109 Id.
"0 THE FEDERALIST 51, supra note 1, at 164.
111 Id.
112 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
"3 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7, 8, 9, cls. 2-7; art. II, § 3; art. III, § 1.
114 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cls. 1-2 (Speech & Debate &
Incompatibility Clauses); art. I, § 7, cl. 9 (Appropriations Clause); art. I, §§ 9-
10; art. II, § 2 (Treaty Clause); art. III, § 2.
115 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
116 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question
Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C.
L. REv. 1165, 1189 (2002).
"' Id. at 1189. The Preamble to the U.S. CONSTITUTION, the Supremacy
Clause, and the amendatory powers contained in Article V, are among the
express affirmations of the sovereignty of the people.
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the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or involving
issues or parties whose character,'' 8 stature, 119 or status 120 makes a
state forum either inappropriate or potentially biased.
The Article III power to resolve cases and controversies thus
assumes that the judicial branch will develop a methodology to
guide constitutional interpretation (standards of review),12  the
power to enunciate its understanding of a particular phrase or
clause of the Constitution (interpretation of constitutional
norms), 122  and jurisdiction to determine which branch or
government has prescriptive power over a given subject or territory
(political jurisdiction), 12 3 It does not, however, include the power
to prescribe the rule of decision in thefirst instance.
Hamilton's words are instructive on this point: judges "ought
to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by
those which are not fundamental."'124 To the extent that the Court
has done so, its holdings must be treated, for all practical purposes,
as "infallible"'125 statements of constitutional law until they are
118 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction" and "between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects").
119 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party").
120 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party" and "Controversies between two or more States").
121 THE FEDERALIST 78, supra note 109 ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion
in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them. ... ").
122 Id. ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body."
123 Id. ("[Nature and reason] teach us that the prior act of a superior ought
to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority;
and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution,
it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard
the former.").
124 id.
125 The late Justice Robert Jackson coined the now famous phrase: "We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (opinion concurring in result).
The use of such imagery to describe the Court's work leads to quite a few
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modified or overruled. 126 Where its jurisdiction is in doubt,
however, the compound nature of the republic makes it inevitable
that Congress, the President, the States, dissenting Justices, and
individuals are entitled to use whatever structural devices the
Constitution makes available to them to challenge overbroad
assertions of judicial authority.
127
FDR's court reorganization plan was such a device. So too
were Congress's decision to eliminate the 1802 Term in response
to the show-cause order issued in Marbury v. Madison,128 and the
misunderstandings concerning the nature of power in the federal system, and
how, if at all, it is shared among all those who participate in its governance,
including "the People."
126 For an extended, and illuminating discussion of the rule of stare decisis,
see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also Charles J.
Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication,
73 CORNELL L REV. 401 (1988); William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 735 (1949).
127 See generally Louis A. Fisher, The Curious Belief in Judicial
Supremacy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 85 (1991).
128 Professor Susan Low Bloch reports that:
[William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, William Harper, and Robert
Townsend Hooe] filed their suit [against Secretary of State James
Madison] during the December 1801 Term, and the Court issued a
rule calling upon Madison to show cause at the Court's next term as
to why a mandamus should not issue. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. That
next term was scheduled for June 1802, but in April 1802, Congress
modified the Court's schedule, providing that the Court was to meet
only once a year, with that session scheduled for the first Monday of
February. Act of April 29, 1802, An Act to Amend the Judicial
System of the United States, 7th Cong., Sess. I, ch. 31, § 1, 1 Stat.
156-67. Since this Act was passed in April, 1802, Congress was in
effect abolishing the June and December 1802 sittings (which had
been established by the Judiciary Act of 1801, 6th Cong., Sess. II, ch.
4, § 1) and thereby effectively recessing the Court for fourteen
months. [George Lee Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of
Power: John Marshall, 1801-15, in II HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 141 (1981)]. Congress's decision to
abolish the 1802 terms was apparently motivated by a desire to delay
the Court's consideration of both Marbury's petition and the repeal of
the Judiciary Act of 1801 [.] See [QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE
CONSTITUTION 13-14 (John A. Garraty ed.,1987.]
Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the
Supreme Court?, 13 WTR EXPERIENCE 24 n.6 (2003).
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many proposals over the years to limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts 129 or to limit their ability to function through the use
of the appropriations process. The Rehnquist Court's emerging
jurisprudence of federalism and separation of powers also utilizes a
structural device to challenge assertions of judicial authority that
its majority deems to be overbroad: the power of judicial review
itself.
2. The Standard of Review as a Guide for Judicial Fact Finding
The role of an Article III judge who must rule on a
constitutional case or controversy is to decide whether the
government has violated the constitutional norms applicable to the
case presented. 130 The function of a standard of review is to define
the quality and quantity of evidence that will lead the judge (or
Justice) to a finding concerning the relevant constitutional fact or
facts. If the factual inquiry produces a finding that the
constitutional norms at issue have been violated, the challenged
action is unconstitutional; if not, the Court defers to the authority
authorized to act. The result is a set of constitutional norms that are
consistently interpreted and applied. 1
31
129 P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 357 (2d ed.
1973). See, e.g., H.R. 2028 and S. 1297.IS (Protect the Pledge Act of 2003),
108th Cong., 1st. Sess. (2003) (proposals to withdraw the jurisdiction of the
federal courts "to hear or determine any claim that the recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance to the Flag ('I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.') violates the first article of
amendment to the Constitution of the United States."). Id.
130 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 n.7
(1992); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
131 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In support of
this interpretation, the Supreme Court stated that:
If the 'compelling interest' test is to be applied at all, then, it must be
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously
commanded. Moreover, if 'compelling interest' really means what it
says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other
fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test.
Id. at 888-89.
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Reading Marbury v. Madison in this way means that the Court
does not have the authority to be "selective" or "deferen[tial] to
majoritarianism and the political process"' 32 in cases where the
Constitution allocates political jurisdiction in a manner
inconsistent with the challenged action. In these instances, the
inquiry is 'jurisdictional," not prudential. 133 A standard of review
that does not accurately reflect the norms from which it is derived
is thus always subject to modification or rejection, no matter how
venerable its pedigree.'
34
C. Why Liberals Need Ackerman 's "Constitutional Moment"
Professor Ackerman has spent many years elaborating and
refining his theory that 1937 was a "constitutional moment" that
advanced the "nation-centered character of the Republican model
of constitutional change"'135 effectuating a "substantive change" in
the allocation of political power. His theory is that "the People
[have] spoken decisively on behalf of activist national
government" in and after the 1937 election, and that "the ideals of
132 See, e.g., DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 207-08 (1996).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); id., (Thomas, J., concurring); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no room
for a balance to be struck because the Vesting Clause of Article 1I and the Ex
Post Facto Clause, art I § 9, cl. 1, deprive Congress of all power over the
criminal prosecution function). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515
U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (controlling norms hostile to the legislative action; no room to
balance), and Bd. of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687, 732, 735-42 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (controlling norms not hostile and arguably inapplicable to the
legislative accommodation at issue).
134 Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a state .. . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts.") with Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16. Pet.) 1
(1842). In cases where constitutional norms require a balancing process, the
result of the process is an interpretation of the norm itself. See Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (comparing "balancing" under the Commerce Clause with, among
other things, balancing under the First Amendment).
135 ACKERMAN, Transformations, supra note 15, at 23.
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the victorious activist Democracy [should] serve as a primary
foundation for constitutional rights in the United States." 
136
In this view, Justice Stone's majority opinion in Carolene
Products is part of a larger political strategy that "brilliantly
endeavored" to use the allocation of political jurisdiction suggested
in footnote four "to turn the Old Court's recent defeat" at the hands
of the New Deal "into a judicial victory."' 37 Attempts by the
Rehnquist Court to upset the allocation of authority assumed in
footnote four places that "judicial victory" at risk. 138 Professor
Ackerman is straightforward when he claims:
These New Deal opinions have operated as the functional
equivalent of formal constitutional amendments, providing a
solid foundation for activist intervention in national social and
economic life for the past sixty years.
136 ACKERMAN, Foundations, supra note 5.
131 Id. at 714.
138 Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 608 (1995) suggests that "it seems fair to ask whether the step taken by the
Court today does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence
from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago." He warns that:
Further glosses on rationality review . . . may be in the offing.
Although this case turns on commercial character, the Court gestures
toward two other considerations that it might sometime entertain in
applying rational basis scrutiny (apart from a statutory obligation to
supply independent proof of a jurisdictional element): does the
congressional statute deal with subjects of traditional state regulation,
and does the statute contain explicit factual findings supporting the
otherwise implicit determination that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce? Once again, any appeal
these considerations may have depends on ignoring the painful lesson
learned in 1937, for neither of the Court's suggestions would square
with rational basis scrutiny.
Id. at 608-09. See also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: An Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55
ARK. L. REv. 795 (2003). Professor Rotunda states that:
A great deal of the academic and political criticism that has
accompanied the recent federalism decisions of the Supreme Court
express the fear that ... these opinions undercut federal power in a
very serious and substantial way, thus preventing the Federal
Government from enacting needed legislation that would be beyond
the capacity of the individual states to regulate
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I do not claim that his New Deal jurisprudence is an
unchangeable element of our Constitution-but then again,
neither is most of the formal text. I do claim that any future
transformation of New Deal principles should require a higher
lawmaking process comparable to the one led by President
Roosevelt in the 1930s.
This is an interesting and important argument, but it is fatally
flawed. Ackerman cannot argue that "[t]he Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal were all acts of constituent
authority,"'140 without also conceding that he is, at bottom, an
advocate of judicial supremacy. Unless "the Constitution is what
the judges say it is,' 14 1 Congress and the President did not need an
act of constituent authority to repudiate the "laissez-faire vision
expressed by Lochner and Hammer."'142 Subject to the structural
devices of separation of powers and federalism, Article I gives
Congress and the President plenary jurisdiction to prescribe the
rules that shall govern the national economy.
An act of constituent (or constitutional) authority is necessary
to justify the post-1937 case law if, and only if, the "constitutional
moment" of 1937 was an affirmation by the People that the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments confer
preemptive jurisdiction to prescribe the substantive content of
individual rights on the Court. At bottom, Ackerman's claim is that
''normal politics" is an insufficient basis for reconsideration of the
Court's holdings in cases where the Court has acted under the Due
Process Clause to limit the scope of federal or state jurisdiction to
prescribe. 43 More, he argues, is required: a demonstration, to the
139 ACKERMAN, Transformations, supra note 15, at 26.
140 Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
141 Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira, New York
(1907), supra note 41.
142 See ACKERMAN, Transformations, supra note 15 at 377.
141 Id. at 381 ("If, after sober second thought, the Court concedes that a
mobilized majority of Americans is demanding fundamental change, it may
begin to retreat from judicially entrenched constitutional principles, giving the
President and Congress an opportunity to consolidate their reformed
constitutional vision by replacing retiring justices with transformative
appointments."). Cf City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Katzenbach




Court's (or Ackerman's) satisfaction that the political branches
have "earn[ed] authority from the People to repudiate" the Court's
holdings. 144
This, of course, is precisely the proposition that FDR rejected
when he condemned the "unending struggle between those who
would preserve this original broad understanding of the
Constitution as a layman's instrument of government and those
who would shrivel the Constitution into a lawyer's contract."'
145
Ackerman, however, is determined to prove that the Court's post-
1937 reliance on the Due Process Clause has the same
constitutional pedigree as the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
If [lawyers] hope to do better, constitutionalists must return to
the sources and discover that they tell a very different story.
They reveal both Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal
Democrats refusing to follow the path for constitutional
amendment set out by their predecessors. Like the Federalists
before them, these reformers self-consciously validated their
initiatives through a series of unconventional institutional
appeals to the People . . . Though the rising constitutional
movement did not respect established norms for revision, it did
not seek to destroy the entire matrix of preexisting institutions.
Instead, it constructed new higher lawmaking processes out of
older institutions, using them as platforms for an
unconventional argument . . . . that our repeated institutional
and electoral victories have provided us with a mandate from
the People adequate to authorize new constitutional law.'
4
There is only one problem with Ackerman's theory that the
New Deal is an example of a form of "higher lawmaking"
functionally equivalent to that which is authorized by Article V; it
does not square with the facts. Even if we assume that the political
processes that resulted in the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment validate a reading of Article V that "makes its
procedures sufficient, but not necessary, for the enactment of a
144 See ACKERMAN, Transformations, supra note 15 at 376.
145 Id. at 377, quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day,
Sept. 17, 1937, cited infra note 56.
146 Id. at 10-12.
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valid amendment,"' 147 the only thing that the Court-packing
controversy shows is that the Court responds to political discipline.
Although FDR challenged the Court's claim that the Due
Process Clause empowers it alone to speak for the Nation, the
Court "renounced no power and [was] subjected to no new
limitation,"'148 either before or after 1937. If anything, the scope of
its claim that the Due Process Clause grants the judiciary
preemptive jurisdiction to prescribe substantive rules has increased
since 1937.
Since neither the text nor structure of the amended
Constitution support such a sweeping claim of judicial authority
under the Due Process Clause, "normal politics" cannot validate it.
The fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was an attempt to
recapture,from the Court itself, powers it had taken from Congress
and the States makes the Due Process Clause a uniquely
implausible foundation for a claim of a judicially-centered
prescriptive jurisdiction over human rights. All that remains to
validate the power claim is Ackerman's theory. As we shall see in
Parts III and IV, the claim that the nation's approbation of the
political program of the New Deal also validates the Court's post-
1937 jurisprudence is wishful thinking, at best.
D. The Conservative Critique of the Rehnquist Court
Conservative critics of the Rehnquist Court's separation of
powers and federalism decisions have no desire to validate the
Court's power claims. Their concerns are more tightly focused on
specific areas of law, such as religious liberty, or the character of
the states as distinct political communities having the right of self-
147 Id. at 15. I do not accept this proposition. It is one thing to argue the
nation is bound by the rules enunciated by the Court when the political branches
have come to accept the Court's holdings on a specific subject, even if they are
wrong. It is quite another to argue that erroneous holdings by the Supreme Court
acquire a constitutional pedigree. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
I express no opinion in this Essay concerning Professor Amar's proposition that
"the People" themselves can amend the Constitution through the use of
procedures other than those enumerated in Article V. See generally Akhil Reed
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article
V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994).
148 JACKSON, supra note 14, at vi.
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government within the scope of their reserved powers. 149 The
political aftermath of the Court's decision in Employment Division
v. Smith 5 ° provides a case in point.
In Smith, the Court held that "the First Amendment has not
been offended" if generally applicable and otherwise valid
legislation has the incidental, or unintended, effect of "prohibiting
the exercise of religion."'' 1 Advocates for religious liberty from
across the political spectrum were outraged that the Court had so
constricted the ability of judges to intervene on behalf of religious
minorities. They formed an extraordinary political coalition, the
explicit goal of which was to neutralize or overturn the decision
through political action in Congress and in the States, as well as
through litigation in state courts.
Conservatives had taken seriously the Court's statement in
Smith that "a society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that
value in its legislation as well,"' 52 and understood it to mean that
the Court would defer to whatever balance of interests Congress
struck between religious liberty and state sovereignty. In Smith's
citation to state laws accommodating minority religious claims,
they also saw a signal that laws explicitly designed to protect
religious freedom would not be subject to attack under the
Establishment Clause. Assuming leadership positions in the
coalition, they petitioned Congress and the State legislatures. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act [RFRA] 153 was the most
important of several federal laws
154 passed in response to Smith.155
149 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Guaranty Clause). See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
150 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
'5' Id. at 878. The Court reaffirmed this holding in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
152 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
114 Congress also put teeth into AIRFA in the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103-344, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1996a (2000). AIRFA now operates as both a legislative accommodation for
individuals, and a preemptive limit on State power to regulate the religious
practices of Native Americans.
155 Numerous state policies seeking to supplant Employment Division v.
Smith were adopted as well, either by statute or judicial decision. See generally
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
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Though some, including this writer, accurately predicted that
the Court would invalidate RFRA on separation of powers and
federalism grounds, 156 most supporters of RFRA were surprised
when the Court held, in City of Boerne v. Flores,157 that it was
unconstitutional. In the words of Judge John Noonan: "The big
break came with Boerne."'
158
The rationale the Court employed in Boerne made the political
reaction worse. Supporters of RFRA had relied upon Ex parte
Virginia159 and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 16 in which the majority
opinions held explicitly that Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment "grant[s] to Congress [the] same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause."'16 1 They therefore
assumed that the Court would accept a statutory direction from
Congress to apply a standard of review-the Sherbert-Yoder
balancing test-it had expressly rejected in Smith. Its holding in
Boerne-that the power to "enforce" depends upon "a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end"' 62  left the impression that the
Court, in a fit of pique over a legislative rejection of its decision in
Smith, was determined to put Congress in its place. 163 Echoing the
sentiments of those worried about the demise of the post-New Deal
role of the Court, some took its holding as a breach of trust.
164
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 126 (1995). See also Frank
B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1529, 1535 (2000) (proposing "a system that justifies the circumstances under
which any of the [branches of government] might merit the last word in
interpretation of the Bill of Rights").
156 See Testimony of Robert A. Destro Before the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee, United States House of
Representatives, "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act," Washington, D.C.,
May 14, 1992 at 305, noted in Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts
Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1099 & n.422 (1993).
"' 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
158 NOONAN, supra note 2, at 15.
"9 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
160 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
161 Id. at 650 n.9.
162 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (1997).
163 See id. (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
164 See NOONAN, supra note 2, at 31 ("Those who relied on such pledges
by the Supreme Court did not consider sufficiently that the court could change
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The decisions in Smith and Boerne illustrate, perhaps better
than most, the inherent tension between the Court's adjudicative
role in cases and controversies raising civil rights issues, and the
prescriptive role in matters of civil rights it assumed after 1937.165
By the time the Court decided Smith, the Court's opinions had
become so closely identified with the substantive scope of the
Religion Clause' 66 that the National Council of Churches'
Counselor on Religious Liberty, the late Dr. Dean Kelley, was
moved to assert in testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee that the practical impact of Smith was a judicial
"repeal" of the Free Exercise Clause itself.167
Supporters of the New Deal vision of federal judicial power
and those who (like this writer) take solace in the fact that both the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment expressly reserve
the power of the states and Congress to protect civil and human
rights readily agreed that the states should take up the slack after
the demise of RFRA, but the agreement stops there. Those who
fear that the Court is systematically dismantling its post-1936
its mind."). Chapter 1, entitled "The Battle of Boerne," recounts some of the
history and much of the reasoning, and disappointment, of RFRA supporters.
165 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, the Court held that
the "fundamental" portions of the Bill of Rights also bind the States. Id. at 325.
This approach, called "selective incorporation," uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to make parts of the Bill of Rights applicable to the
States as well as the federal government. The prescriptive claim is that because
Article III gives the Court the power to interpret the Constitution, and because
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment binds the States, the Court has the
power to import "substantive" content into the Due Process Clause. The Court
"selectively" determines which liberties contained in the Bill of Rights are
"fundamental," and the rights the Court declares fundamental binds the States.
What is not "fundamental" binds only the federal government.
166 There is considerable debate over the proper nomenclature to be
assigned to the religion-specific provisions of the First Amendment. Some,
including perhaps a majority of the Court, view these provisions as analytically
distinct clauses. Others view them as integral parts of a single clause.
167 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 27 (1990) (statement of Rev. Dean M. Kelley,
Counselor on Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches). In Dr. Kelley's
view, the majority's rejection of the compelling state interest standard of review
in cases involving religious practice burdened by laws of general applicability
repeals the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id.
414 [Vol. 12
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vision of its role in the system fear that "conservative judicial
activism" may include reconsideration of the "constitutional
moment" when the Hughes Court struck a strategic political
bargain with the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. Since
there is widespread agreement that the Hughes Court's
"constitutional moment" had the effect of reallocating political
jurisdiction, any move by the Rehnquist Court to reopen questions
long thought settled by politicians and the academy would not
simply betray the bargain. By suggesting that the text and structure
of the Constitution impose just as many limits on the power of the
Judicial Branch "to say what the law is" as they do on the
respective powers of Congress, the President, and the States, it
would do so in the worst possible way.
In the sections that follow, I develop the argument that the
Court's post-1936 jurisprudence about the reach of congressional
power makes it very unlikely that the Court is on the verge of
waging a pre-1936-style campaign to limit the otherwise legitimate
exercise of federal and state legislative jurisdiction. The more
interesting question is whether it has begun to reconsider the scope
of its own post-1936 claims that Article III empowers it to
prescribe substantive rules of conduct that cannot be revised or
changed without either a formal constitutional amendment or a
judicial change of heart.
It troubles advocates of a more limited judicial power to
prescribe under the Due Process Clause to watch the Court struggle
to develop a coherent rationale for cutting back on the scope of
congressional power, even while reaffirming or extending the
scope of its own power claims.168 In this regard, I agree with Judge
Noonan. Should the Court be attempting to aggrandize its own
power at the expense of Congress or of the States, the situation
would be serious indeed.
Based on my own review of the Court's jurisprudence, I draw
the slightly more optimistic conclusion that the situation is
"hopeless, but not serious." Judge Noonan is correct to observe that
"[t]he big break came with Boerne,"'169 but I respectfully disagree
168 See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 2003 WL
1791206 (U.S., April 7, 2003); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873
(1992).
169 NOONAN, supra note 2, at 15.
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that the Court's rejection of RFRA was the constitutional travesty
he suggests it to be. Boerne says next to nothing about the power of
Congress to write laws designed to protect religious liberty or
anything else, but speaks volumes about the propensity of judges to
substitute their own views for those of the legislature without first
examining the reasons for its actions. This, of course, is precisely
what got the Court in trouble with FDR.
Viewed from the vantage point provided by the concept of
political jurisdiction, it is possible that the Rehnquist Court is taking
the first tentative steps in the direction FDR suggested when he
asked where judges get the power to "read into the Constitution
language which the Framers refused to write into the
Constitution."' 170 Read together as an Essay on the nature of the
judicial task, the opinions in Smith and Boerne opinion come very
close to suggesting that the answer to FDR's question is that they
have no such power.
Both opinions reject a standard of review that permits ' Judges
[to] weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of
all religious beliefs."'7  In Smith, the Court concluded that the
Sherbert-Yoder formulation was bad constitutional law because it
permits judges to engage in a balancing process unfettered by any
standard other than their own commitment to religious liberty and
their impressions concerning the bona fide arguments of the
complaining party. When Congress responded by writing the
Sherbert-Yoder standard of review into RFRA, the Court used the
dispute in Boerne to remind Congress that its power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer unfettered
lawmaking discretion on Congress either.
Though it will likely prove impossible to apply in practice, the
purpose of Boerne's holding regarding the need for "congruence
and proportionality" in Congressional attempts to remedy
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment is clear. Both federalism
170 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), in
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (1938-1950)
366 (Samuel Rosenman ed., 1937), quoted in ACKERMAN, Transformations,
supra note 15, at 379. This address is also available online at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library and Museum, at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/tmirhsee
(last visited July 5, 2003).
171 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (emphasis
added).
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and separation of powers are compromised when either Congress
or the Court adopts an overbroad standard for the exercise of
judicial discretion.
III. To WHOM HAVE THE PEOPLE DELEGATED THE PRIMARY POWER
OF PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: CONGRESS, THE FEDERAL
COURTS, OR THE STATES?
It is now time to take a hard look at the Court's post-1936 role
in the system, and to ask whether its pre-1936 power claims differ
in any great degree from those made after 1936. It should come as
no surprise that they do not.
There is no better way to illustrate the inherent difficulty with
the Court's post-1936 jurisprudence of federalism and separation
of powers than to focus on the area of law in which it is said to
have its greatest "comparative competence and 'expertise:"'
individual rights. 172 The usual approach to such an endeavor is
substantive. A substantive approach will feature either an
examination of specific substantive rules announced by the Court
in important areas such as the First Amendment; 173 or trace the
legal, political, and philosophical developments that led to the
Court's post-1936 preference for individual rights. 174 The approach
taken here, by contrast, will be jurisdictional, and will utilize the
structural devices of federalism and separation of powers to
examine the "paradigm shift" of 1937.
172 WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1980)
(citing HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 82 (2d ed. 1973)); MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 29-30 (1966); Clifton
McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 HOUS. L.
REv. 354, 360-61 (1966).
173 See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
(holding that children who were Jehovah's Witnesses could be compelled to
salute the flag), rev'd W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
174 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in
Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1441, 1461 (1991) (noting the ways in
which disdain for economic due process and a preference for individual rights
characterized the views of the "Great Dissenters" of the Taft Court-Justices
Holmes and Brandeis); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205 (1983).
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In order to set the stage for the discussion, it will be necessary
to examine United States v. Carolene Products Co. 175 This case
lies at the root of the seemingly endless political and academic
debates over which persons and groups should be singled out for
special judicial or legislative protection. Under the logic of
Carolene Products, the Court claims the power to determine not
only whose interests shall be protected in judicial proceedings, but
also the prescriptive jurisdiction to determine, as an initial matter,
what interests Congress has the power to protect from State
interference.' 
76
These are questions of profound importance in a
representative democracy, 177 but most discussions tend to focus on
115 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
176 In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court held that those
portions of the Bill of Rights protecting "fundamental rights" apply to the states
via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Selective
incorporation" assumes that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorizes the Court to make parts of the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states. The claim is that because Article III gives the Court the power to
interpret the Constitution, and because Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
binds the states, the Court has the power to import substantive content into the
Due Process Clause. The Court "selectively" determines which liberties
contained in the Bill of Rights are "fundamental." What the Court declares
fundamental binds the states. What is not fundamental binds only the federal
government. Id. See also, supra note 167 and accompanying text. Palko thus
raises at least two significant questions: (1) Where does the Court get the
authority to prioritize the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights? and (2) Which
of the rights characterized as "fundamental" takes priority when they may
conflict?
The Court's opinion in Palko does not answer these questions, but it
implicitly adopts the view that there is "an implied hierarchy of constitutional
values." Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90
MICH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1991). Otherwise, the Court would necessarily
characterize all rights in the Bill of Rights as fundamental. See generally Louis
FISHER, Separation of Powers & Federalism, in 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES -422-23 (4th ed. 2001). The Incorporation
Doctrine also raises two important "structural" questions: (1) Federalism-the
extent to which the federal government, including the Court, may regulate state
action and (2) Separation of powers-which federal branch has the power to
decide whether a right is "fundamental enough" to restrict state action.
177 William Van Alstyne has noted that "'it is difficult to imagine a more
consequential subject' than the relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Bill of Rights." William W. Van Alstyne, Foreword to MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,
No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
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the details of when and under what circumstances certain litigants,
rights, or individuals should get special attention from the courts.
Though these are important questions, the initial one is
jurisdictional: On what grounds does the Court exercise
prescriptive authority in the first instance?
178
Were the answer to this question found in, or easily implied
from, the text, structure, or history of the Constitution, the task
would be an easy one. Instead, we are facing one of the most
enduring questions in constitutional law: "the problem of
[political] legitimacy raised whenever nine elderly lawyers
invalidate [or uphold] the legislative decision of a majority of our
elected representatives."' 
79
Given the importance of the question, one might expect that
there might be an extended discussion of the issue in at least one
opinion. There is not. All we have is the following statement by
Justice William Brennan in a footnote to the majority opinion in
Oregon v. Mitchell:
[T]he statements of Bingham and Howard ... indicate that the
framers of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were not always clear
whether they understood it merely as a grant of power to
Congress or whether they thought, in addition, that it would
confer power upon the courts, which the courts would use to
achieve equality of rights. Since §5 is clear in its grant of
power to Congress and we have consistently held that the
Amendment grants power to the courts, this issue is of
academic interest only.' 
80
From a jurisdictional perspective, this is a very interesting
statement. Because the Court's power to decide cases or
controversies is defined by Article III, it needs no additional power
RIGHTS, at ix (1986). Others have echoed this sentiment. See, e.g., Akhil R.
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1198-1203 (1992) (discussing the relationship between the general prohibitions
of Article I, Section 9, and the specific prohibitions of Article 1, Section 10
(binding the states), and the First Amendment (binding Congress alone)).
178 1 discuss these questions at length in two articles. Destro, supra note 13;
Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J. L. &
RELIGION 355 (1995).
179 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 715.
180 400 U.S. 112, 264 n.37 (1970).
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to declare "what the law is" under the Fourteenth, or any other,
amendment. Justice Brennan must therefore be referring to another
type of power that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to "confer ... upon the courts"- prescriptive jurisdiction.
Without jurisdiction to prescribe, it would not be possible, in
Justice Brennan's words, for "the courts [to] use [section one] to
achieve equality of rights."
Like any other claim of political jurisdiction, the nature and
scope of the Court's assertion that the Fourteenth Amendment
grants it preemptive, prescriptive jurisdiction over both Congress
and the States must be justified on the basis of a fair reading of the
text, structure, and history of the Constitution and its amendments.
Like the late Chief Justice Earl Warren, we must assume, for
analytical purposes at least, that "the fact that the Court rules in a
case ... that a given program is constitutional, does not necessarily
answer the question whether, in a broader sense, it actually is."
1 81
A. The Realpolitik of Footnote Four
Footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. has
been variously described as "The Most Celebrated Footnote in
Constitutional Law"'182 and "the core of the constitutional case for
judicial review." 183 Those are significant appellations. In order to
understand how a few paragraphs of dicta appearing as a footnote
in a case that deals with Congressional authority to regulate the
sale of "filled milk"'184 have acquired such cosmic status, we must
consider the practical politics, or Realpolitik,185 of footnote four.
181 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
181, 193 (1962). This point is discussed at length in Louis Fisher, Ph.D.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1994).
182 WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 17 (5th
ed. 1996).
183 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 745 ("Carolene remains at the core of the
constitutional case for judicial review.").
184 Relying on the House and Senate Agriculture Committee reports
supporting the passage of the "Filled Milk Act," the Court described "filled
milk" as "milk compounds made of condensed milk from which the butter fat
has been extracted and an equivalent amount of vegetable oil, usually coconut
oil, substituted. These compounds resemble milk in taste and appearance and are
distributed in packages resembling those in which pure condensed milk is
distributed." United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 444, 149 n.2
420 [Vol. 12
2003] THE REALPOLITIK OF FOOTNOTE FOUR 421
The use of national political power to resolve social and
economic problems was the political centerpiece of the New Deal.
In the first "Fireside Chat" of his second term, FDR described the
three branches in "the American form of Government as a three
horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so
that their field might be plowed."'186 Drawing a distinction between
(1938). See also Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987
SUP. CT. REV. 397.
185 The term "Realpolitik" is derived from the German [real = actual +
Politik = politics], and is understood to mean "politics based on practical and
material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED ONLINE at http://www.meriamwebster.com (2003)
(last visited June 10, 2003).
186 The text of the Fireside Chat "On the Reorganization of the Judiciary"
given on Tuesday, March 9, 1937 is available as part of the online collection of
the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum available at
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/030937.html (last visited June 10, 2003). It is
also available in print in 6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 1937, THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS
123-25 (1941). The excerpts in the text are taken from the paragraphs quoted
below.
I described the American form of Government as a three horse
team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that
their field might be plowed. The three horses are, of course, the three
branches of government-the Congress, the Executive and the
Courts. Two of the horses are pulling in unison today; the third is not.
Those who have intimated that the President of the United States is
trying to drive that team, overlook the simple fact that the President,
as Chief Executive, is himself one of the three horses. It is the
American people themselves who are in the driver's seat. It is the
American people who want the furrow ploughed. It is the American
people themselves who expect the third horse to pull in unison with
the other two.
But since the rise of the modern movement for social and
economic progress through legislation, the Court has more and more
often and more and more boldly asserted a power to veto laws passed
by the Congress and State Legislatures in complete disregard of this
original limitation. In the last four years the sound rule of giving
statutes the benefit of all reasonable doubt has been cast aside. The
Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making
body. When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture,
to improve the conditions of labor, to safeguard business against
unfair competition, to protect our national resources, and in many
other ways, to serve our clearly national needs, the majority of the
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"the proper use of its judicial functions" and an "improper" claim
of power to "set itself up as a third house of the Congress-a
super-legislature ... [by] reading into the Constitution words and
implications which are not there, and which were never intended to
be there," he argued that "[t]he Courts ... have cast doubts on the
ability of the elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by
meeting squarely our modem social and economic conditions."
187
His plea was a simple one. Quoting Justice Bushrod
Washington in Ogden v. Saunders,188 FDR argued that "[i]t is but a
decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity and the patriotism
of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in
favour of its validity until its violation of the Constitution is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt."' 89 In his view, proper respect for the
separation of powers should have required the Court, "the third
horse[,] to pull in unison with the other two."' 
90
Until Roosevelt's announcement that he was sending to
Congress a "Recommendation to Reorganize the Judicial Branch
of the Federal Government,"' 191 it had been thought that the only
way to bring the Court to heel was to amend the Constitution.
92
The Court-packing plan was so simple, and such a direct attack on
the Court itself, that it sent shockwaves through the American
political establishment.
Then-Attorney General Robert Jackson described the plan as
an "exemplary and disciplinary" political attack. 193 The Court
understood it as such, and appears to have interpreted it as an
attack on the power of judicial review itself.194 So, apparently, did
Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these
Acts of the Congress-and to approve or disapprove the public policy
written into these laws.
Id.
187 id.
188 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
189 Id. at 270.
190 Roosevelt, "On the Reorganization of the Judiciary" supra note 91.
191 See supra, note 91.
192 Several proposals had been introduced to that end. See Kline, supra
note 89.
193 JACKSON, supra note 14, at vii. He made this observation before he was
appointed to the Court.
194 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 401-07 (1937)
(Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
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its allies. 95 What interests us here, however, is its institutional
reaction to Roosevelt's attack.
There are various interpretations of the famous "switch in time
that saved nine."196 Among them is Jackson's observation that the
Court "subdued the rebellion against their constitutional dogma by
joining it,' 9 7 and Bruce Ackerman's more fulsome description of
Carolene Products as the Court's acceptance of "a revolutionary
transformation of traditional doctrine" that was to be accomplished
through a combination of "transformative judicial appointments"
and "transformative judicial opinions."'
' 98
Since no one knows for certain what prompted Justice Owen
Robert's change of heart, there is very little to support the
proposition that Carolene Products was a "rebellion" against
anything. There is even less to support the claim that the Court
intended "a revolutionary transformation of traditional doctrine."
All we have is the Court's opinions-and they indicate a clear
intent to reaffirm its position that substantive due process is a
legitimate tool for controlling the exercise of legislative discretion.
There is widespread agreement that the Court's decisions in
West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish'99 and National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel2 °° are the transition
points in the "crisis of 1937," after which the Court ceased to
challenge New Deal social and economic legislation. 20 ' The
question that concerns us here is: What changed?
According to Robert Jackson, the Justices "subdued the
rebellion against their constitutional dogma by joining it."20 2 In one
sense, that is true. There is no question that the Court "subdued the
195 JACKSON, supra note 14, at vii.
196 The quip is attributed to Joseph Alsop. Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black:
A Biography 214 (1994).
197 JACKSON, supra note 14, at vi. Accord Ackerman, supra note 37, at
714-15.
198 ACKERMAN, Transformations, supra note 15, at 25-26.
"' 300 U.S. 379 (1937), aff'g Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 55 P.2d
1083 (1936).
200 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
201 See generally HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND:
RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994); THOMAS FLEMING,
THE NEW DEALER'S WAR: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE WAR WITHIN
WORLD WAR II 59-62 (2001).
202 JACKSON, supra note 14, at 25-26.
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rebellion" by ceding the field of social and economic legislation to
Congress, but it is also true that the Hughes Court never gave FDR
what he really wanted: a clear statement that the Court eschewed
"the power to pass on the wisdom of ... Acts of the Congress and
to approve or disapprove the public policy written into these
laws."
203
In a brilliant two-step maneuver, the Court did precisely the
opposite. It simultaneously reaffirmed its claim of power to review
the "substance" of legislation for consistency with a vision of
"fundamental rights" rooted in principles reflected in, but existing
largely outside, the constitutional text,20 4 and "withdrew" its claim
of authority to subject Congressional economic regulations to
"substantive" review under the Due Process Clause. In short, it
"redefined" due process. From West Coast Hotel onward, a
commercial or economic "regulation which is reasonable in
203 6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 1937: THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS 125 (1941),
quoted in Kline, supra note 89, at 924.
204 See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996) ("[I]t is the common law
approach, not the approach that connects law to an authoritative text, or an
authoritative decision by the Framers or by 'we the people,' that best explains,
and best justifies, American constitutional law today."). Id. at 879; Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161 (1988). In
support of this interpretation, Professor Sunstein argues that:
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted
largely (though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices
against short-run departures. The clause has therefore been associated
with a particular conception of judicial review, one that sees the
courts as safeguards against novel developments brought about by
temporary majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of
history. The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, has been
understood as an attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from
discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding.
The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to
the Due Process issue whether an existing or time-honored
convention, described at the appropriate level of generality, is
violated by the practice under attack. By contrast, the Equal
Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that
were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were expected
to endure. The two clauses therefore operate along different tracks.
Id. at 1163-64 (footnote omitted).
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relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process. "
205
In order to see the reaffirmation of judicial power in the
Carolene Products formulation of the standard of review, it is
necessary to compare the Carolene holding concerning the scope
of review in cases involving the exercise of legislative authority
over commercial and economic issues with the standard of review
it would apply in cases involving civil rights.
The text accompanying footnote four contains the standard of
review to be applied to "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions." It reads:
Even in the absence of [legislative findings and history], the
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.2 °6
After West Coast Hotel, "due process" in cases involving
"regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions"
is the legislative process unless there is a clear indication that the
decision made was "of such a character" that casts doubt on the
existence of any process of rational decisionmaking.
205 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (emphasis
added). In Parrish, the Court stated that:
[T]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governing the
states, as the due process clause invoked in the Adkins Case governed
Congress[,] . . . speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the
Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Liberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due
process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject
and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.
Id.
206 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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Footnote four, by contrast, deals with judicial process, and
reaffirms the Court's prior holdings concerning the scope of its
own power under the Due Process Clause. The Carolene Court
states that:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation, [such as] restrictions upon the
right to vote, restraints upon the dissemination of information,
interferences with political organizations, [and] prohibition of
peaceable assembly.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or
national, or racial minorities[,] whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which ma call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
Many have remarked that the footnote sets forth its position in
terms that are "tentative . . .exploratory[,] and hesitant. ' 2" Given
207 Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). The actual holding in Carolene
Products is that "any rational basis" is the appropriate standard of review for
Congressional action challenged under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 152-54.
208 Professor Jack Balkin observes that the Carolene Products footnotes all
start with the following diffident phrases: "'There may be narrower scope for... ';
'It is unnecessary to consider now.. . '; and 'Nor need we enquire whether.... "
J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 N.W. U.L. REV. 275, 284 (1989), quoting
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4, quoted in Winter, supra note 210, at
1463 n.104.
426 [Vol. 12
THE REALPOLITIK OF FOOTNOTE FOUR
the politics of the time, it did not really have much choice. °9 But
closer examination of the text of the footnote indicates that the
Court made a sweeping, but subtle, political move in response to
Roosevelt's plan.
The first paragraph appears to be a rather unexceptional
restatement of the rule in Marbury v. Madison. 21 The second
paragraph, however, bears closer scrutiny. It is one thing to argue
that the federal government is the ultimate guarantor of the
integrity of the political process, and that it has a critically
important role to play in the protection of other rights, whether
listed in the Bill of Rights or not. It is quite another to argue that
the Court is the beneficiary of a grant of preemptive or prescriptive
power "under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 211 In time, the Court will utilize the Due Process
Clause to claim judicial supremacy-that is preemptive political
jurisdiction-over issues of civil rights.
In retrospect, the Court's reaction to the Court-packing plan
was better planned and executed than Roosevelt's. After Carolene
Products, the right to review legislation concerning economic
regulation, the structure and organization of the federal
government, state-federal relationships, and social welfare would
be ceded to the comparative competence and expertise of the
political branches. 212 In exchange, the Judicial Branch would claim
primary jurisdiction (or, to borrow a phrase from Louis Lusky, the
self-proclaimed author of footnote four213 an "area of judicial
209 Opposition to the Court-packing plan "included organized bar groups,
(particularly the American Bar Association), the Catholic Church and other
religious entities, national farm organizations, most newspaper publishers,
corporate executives, and isolationist groups that traditionally hated Roosevelt."
Kline, supra note 89, at 917.
210 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
211 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
212 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-6- Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
213 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 1
(1942) (presenting the arguments for the need for special solicitude for the
interests of minorities by the law clerk who drafted Carolene's footnote 4).
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hegemony 214) over individual rights, access to the political
215process, and (of course) control over the scope of its own power.
Wrapping itself in the mantle of civil and human rights turned
out to be a brilliant political strategy. The Court's track record in
those fields was abysmal in the mid-1930s, 216 but was perceived to
be improving. 217 By deftly asserting that the power of judicial
review is most appropriately exercised in those settings where "the
ideals of the victorious activist Democracy [could also] serve as a
primary foundation for constitutional rights in the United States,"
Justice Stone's majority opinion "brilliantly endeavored" to use the
footnote as a part of a larger political strategy "to turn the Old
Court's recent defeat [at the hands of the New Deal] into a judicial
victory.,
218
And he did so. At the end of the Court-packing controversy,
the Court had, in the words of Robert Jackson, "renounced no
power and [was] subjected to no new limitation."219 As a direct
result of the partition of political jurisdiction suggested in
Carolene Products, the Court's power actually increased relative
to Congress and the States, and was to serve for nearly sixty years
as the "firm [political] ground ... upon which [the Court was] to
rebuild the institution of judicial review" after the crisis of 1937.220
214 Louis LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME
COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 109 (1975).
215 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally
Destro, supra note 13; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1992).
216 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 244 U.S. 200 (1925) (involuntary sterilization of
the mentally retarded); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1873) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to Illinois court rules denying
women admission to the Bar); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856).
217 See Kline, supra note 89, at 917.
218 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 714.
219 JACKSON, supra note 14, at vi.
220 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 714.
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B. The Dubious Pedigree of Footnote Four
Carolene Products is "The Most Celebrated Footnote in
Constitutional Law"22  because it encapsulates the heart and soul
of the post-New Deal understanding of the role of the Court in our
political system. In the face of nearly overwhelming political
opposition, the Court developed a "new constitutional paradigm
[that] was a virtual mirror image of the Old Court's jurisprudence:
judicial deference in areas of economic regulation and judicial
protection of civil rights and liberties."
222
So successful has been the reconstruction of the Court's image
that the conventional wisdom in constitutional circles "is the fact
that the Carolene Products Footnote is about values 2 23 and
"participation ... either in the political processes by which values
are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the
accommodation those processes have reached. 2 24 The assumption
that "Carolene remains at the core of the constitutional case for
judicial review" 225 is so firm that even a civil libertarian of the
stature of Bruce Ackerman must assure his audience that
thoughtful, constructive criticism of the "bad political science,
22 6
at the core of the footnote is not intended, in any way, "to deny the
obvious unconstitutionality involved in excluding minorities from
the nation's political life."227 Thus, academic discussions of
footnote four almost always focus on either "the proud role that
Carolene has played in the pursuit of constitutional values over the
past half-century,"228 or the manner in which its rationale can be
adapted "to a changing political reality."
229
There are at least two problems with this picture. First, it is
political and legal nonsense. Footnote four is a discussion of the
standard of review. As such, it deals explicitly with the balance of
power between the Court and the legislature, not values. Second,
221 LOCKHART, supra note 184, at 17.
222 Winter, supra note 176, at 1462 nn.98-99.
223 Linzer, supra note 14, at 302.
224 ELY, supra note 19, at 77.
225 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 745.
226 id.
228 Id. at 716.




Bruce Ackerman's fear that those who question the "bad political
science 2 30 in the footnote will be accused of anti-civil rights
animus underscores not only the symbolic strength of the political
mantle in which the Court wrapped itself in 1937, but also the
inherently political nature of the "anti-civil rights" charge.
Save for those who go so far as to question the existence of the
power of judicial review itself 231 (and I am not one of them), the
outrage about the "activism" of the Rehnquist Courts seems a bit
selective and the history a bit revisionist. So too is the exquisite
sensitivity of those who see in the Court's post-1937 jurisprudence
a constitutional warrant to experiment with our liberties. Civil
rights enforcement, however, is far too important a topic, both
across-the-board and on the specific question of judicial fidelity to
the civil rights commands of the Constitution, for anyone
interested in the debate to be subject to petty censorship. Truth be
told, the Court has never been on the cutting edge of civil rights. In
fact, it has often been on the wrong side.
The Court began its flirtation with the concept of substantive
due process in Dred Scott v. Sandford.232 In the face of both
constitutional text and massive historical evidence to the contrary,
it has assumed that the Constitution assigns the power to define the
substantive content of both liberty and equality to the judiciary.
Carolene Products reaffirms that proposition, and lays institutional
claim that the Court is the embodiment of the Constitution and the
233"infallible" arbiter of its meaning.
Thus, it is unsurprising that, like Robert Jackson, Bruce
Ackerman acknowledges that pre-1937 judicial activism did not
stop. It was simply redirected. The ideals of economic laissez-faire
gave way to the social agenda of "victorious activist Democracy."
130 Id. at 714.
23! See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 3, at 12.
232 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). See David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal Powers, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J.
695, 735-36 nn.255-64 (1983).
233 The late Justice Robert Jackson coined the now-famous phrase: "We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible because we are final."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). The
use of such imagery to describe the Court's work leads to quite a few
misunderstandings concerning the nature of the Court's power in the federal
system.
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In this regard, a slight revision of Jackson's observation conveys
the message a bit more clearly: The Court "subdued the rebellion
against their constitutional dogma by joining"234 in the New Deal's
vision of a "victorious activist Democracy," and by putting the
engine of substantive due process to work on its behalf.
C. Judicial Review and Power Politics
We now turn to a closer examination of how Carolene
Products logic affects our reading of the Constitution's allocation
of prescriptive jurisdiction to define and protect human rights. In
doing so, it is useful to bear in mind Justice Jackson's observation
that: "Constitutional lawsuits are the stuff of power politics in
America. The Court may be, and usually is, above party politics
and personal politics, but the politics of power is a most important
and delicate function, and adjudication of litigation is its
technique. 235
Four important assumptions about the relationship of judging
to politics, and of politics to civil and human rights lie at the core
of Bruce Ackerman's claim that "any future transformation of New
Deal principles should require a higher lawmaking process
comparable to the one led by President Roosevelt in the 1930's.236
The first and most important of these assumptions is one of
law: that the Constitution makes the Judicial Branch supreme with
respect to the definition and enforcement of constitutional rights.
237
The remaining three assumptions are mixed questions of law and
politics concerning the role of the Court.
If the Court has jurisdiction to prescribe, it is logical for
Ackerman and others to assume: (1) the Court "proposed to make
the ideals of the victorious activist Democracy [embodied in the
New Deal]" serve as the "primary foundation" for individual
rights; (2) lawyers, therefore, should respond by "organiz[ing] their
234 JACKSON, supra note 14, at vi. Accord Ackerman, supra note 32, at
714-15.
235 JACKSON, supra note 14, at 287-88.
236 ACKERMAN, Transformations, supra note 15, at 26.
237 The Court made this claim explicit in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958), and reaffirmed it in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The
claim of interpretive supremacy is defended by Professors Larry Alexander &




concern for individual rights through a constitutional rhetoric" that
reflects this value orientation; 238 and (3) litigation is the device by
which the Court adopts that rhetoric as policy. In this view, the
legislative branches, Congress, and the state legislatures play but a
supporting role.
Given the political character of these assumptions, it is
imperative that a visage of neutrality be maintained. Although
footnote four functions as a political blank check on which
lawyers, led by the Court, can write at will, its academic supporters
often behave like the old man behind the curtain in The Wizard of
Oz. 2 3 9 Most lawyers and academics simply assume that the
Constitution supports the implicit partition of political jurisdiction
embodied in footnote four. It is one of those "fundamental
assumptions [that] appear so obvious that people do not know what
they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever
occurred to them., 240 Furthermore, "we the people" are to accept
the Court's conceptions of our liberties whenever the "principled
character [of a given ruling] is sufficiently plausible to be accepted
by the Nation,, 241 even if the text of the Constitution says
otherwise. 242 The scope of the Court's power under the Fourteenth
238 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 714-15.
239 In The Wizard of Oz, when Dorothy, Scarecrow, Tin Man, and
Cowardly Lion confront the Wizard and ask that he prove his powers, they are
instructed to ignore the man who appears to be running the show. They are
counseled to fix their gaze instead on the image of "The Great and Powerful Oz"
projected (with suitable sound and fury) on a large screen. Only after they
follow his instructions to the letter do they find (much to their chagrin) that the
real Wizard bears no resemblance to the image, and worse, that he has no idea
how to get young Dorothy back to Kansas.
240 Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School
Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 247-48 (1978).
24! Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (adopting "undue burden" standard) (hereinafter Casey).
242 Compare, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990) ("We have
never held ... that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the
absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial.")
(majority opinion per O'Connor, J.) (emphasis added) with id. at 860 (Scalia,
Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) ("Seldom has this Court failed so
conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the
tide of prevailing current opinion.").
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Amendment is not to be litigated or questioned. It is, in the Court's
own words, a matter "of academic interest only.,
243
Even though the political logic of footnote four is
constitutionally infirm, Justice Scalia is correct to observe that it
"would be impossible and perhaps undesirable to return to the
assumptions of pre-1937 doctrine."2 44 The pre-1937 assumptions
are problematic for the very same reason that the post-1937
decision to utilize disparate levels of scrutiny for property and
personal rights are problematic. The Constitution does not support
them.
If the Constitution makes no distinction between personal and
property rights, why should the Court? Nothing in the Constitution
makes the "discreteness" or "insularity" of a minority group
relevant to the Equal Protection Clause. It simply states a rule of
conduct. Why then should the type or degree of protection owed by
the Court itself to individuals who claim the protection of the
Citizenship and Equal Protection Clauses vary in accordance with
the Court's perception of their social status or need?245 The
footnote does not tell us, and the Court has never provided an
answer.
246
In order to pass constitutional muster, each of the propositions
in footnote four that are alleged to support the Court's power to be
"selective" must be justified by reference to the norms they are
243 Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112, 264 n.37 (1970), quoted in supra text
accompanying note 182.
Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs in J.A. DORN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, 33-34 (1987).
245 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The relevant proposition is not that it was
blacks, or Jews, or Irish who were discriminated against, but that it was
individual men and women, 'created equal,' who were discriminated against.
And the relevant resolve is that that should never happen again.").
246 The point made in the text goes to the Court's duty only, not that of the
United States government. Under Article III, the Court's primary legal and
ethical duty is to the litigants that appear in the "case or controversy" pending
before it. Congress has both the remedial duty and power under Sections 1 and 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that "equal protection of the laws" is not
merely a slogan to be observed on official occasions, but a present reality
embodied in both law and culture. The President is, of course, sworn to see that
policies ensuring equal protection are "faithfully executed."
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intended to enforce. If they cannot be so justified, the Court
exceeds the scope of its power, and has become a law unto itself.
247
IV. RESTATING THE POWER EQUATION: THE REHNQUIST COURT AS
AN ADVOCATE OF A "ROBUST" VISION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Beyond Carolene Products, Bruce Ackerman warned "that
the weaknesses in Carolene's defense of minority rights [cannot]
long remain a professional secret locked in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review. Instead, Carolene's errors will become
increasingly apparent on the surface of American political life.
'248
He could not have known just how prescient his 1985 warning
would be. Justice Antonin Scalia took his seat on the Supreme
Court in 1986, and his jurisprudence has paved the way for a
frontal attack on the political, legal, and philosophical structure of
the Carolene Products approach. In order to see the pattern,
however, it is necessary to focus on the standard of review issues
that lie at the root of Carolene Products.
A. A Preliminary Note on the Function of the "Standard of Review"
The role of an Article III judge who must rule on a
constitutional case or controversy is to decide whether the
government has violated the constitutional norms applicable to the
case presented.249 Because the standard of review is the means by
which the Court defines and enforces constitutional norms, its
function is to define the quality and quantity of evidence that will
lead the judge (or Justice) to a finding concerning the relevant
constitutional fact or facts. If the inquiry produces a finding that
the constitutional norms at issue have been violated, the challenged
action is unconstitutional; if not, the Court defers to the authority
247 In some cases, the Court has arguably gone farther than Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), permits. It has assumed powers
expressly denied. See generally Destro, supra note 27, at 355.
248 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 744.
249 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 & n.7
(1992); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprs., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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authorized to act. The result is a set of constitutional norms that are
consistently interpreted and applied.25°
Reading Marbury v. Madison in this way means that the Court
does not have the authority to be "selective" or "deferential to
majoritarianism and the political process" 251 in cases where the
Constitution allocates political jurisdiction in a manner
inconsistent with the challenged action. In these instances, the
inquiry is "jurisdictional" not prudential.252 A standard of review
that does not accurately reflect the norms from which it is derived
is thus always subject to modification or rejection, no matter how
venerable its pedigree.
253
250 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In support of
this conclusion, the Smith Court stated,
If the 'compelling interest' test is to be applied at all, then, it
must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be
religiously commanded. Moreover, if 'compelling interest'
really means what it says (and watering it down here would
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many
laws will not meet the test.
Id. at 888-89.
251 See, e.g., DAVID SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 207-08 (1996).
252 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Id. At 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there is no room for a balance to be struck because the Vesting
Clause of Article II and the Ex Post Facto Clause, art. I § 9, cl. 1, deprive
Congress of all power over the criminal prosecution function). See also Bd. of
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732, 735-42 (1994) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., and
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (controlling norms not hostile and arguably
inapplicable to the legislative accommodation at issue) and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (controlling norms hostile to the legislative action;
no room to balance).
253 Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a state ... And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.") with Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16. Pet.) 1 (1842). In
cases where constitutional norms require a balancing process, the result of the
process is an interpretation of the norm itself See Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(comparing "balancing" under the Commerce Clause with, among other things,
balancing under the First Amendment).
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Footnote four, by contrast, suggests that a standard of review
serves two purposes. The first-or "symbolic function"-is to
provide assurance that the Court is committed to protecting
constitutional rights and other important values. The other-the
"prudential function"-provides a flexible mechanism that permits
the Court to balance the prescriptive rules embedded in
constitutional norms against specific governmental interests in the
regulation of conduct. The net result is to allow the Justices to
strike "sensible balances" between and among the competing
values and interests they deem to be important in any given case.
The constitutional norm (if it can be described as one) "floats," and
is defined by a tipping point that can only be discerned from the
legal, social, or political context in which the specific case at issue
arises.
255
254 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring, with whom Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.
concurred in part); Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (Blackmun
and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in the judgment). For the Justices who joined the
majority opinion in Smith (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, White, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist), most of the criteria relevant to striking such a balance are
simply irrelevant: the degree of burden, the "centrality" of the belief, the
importance of the State's interest, and one's status in the community (i.e. as a
"minority," however defined). When the task is striking "balances" of this sort,
their preference (at least in some cases) appears to be for the legislature. The
dissenters, including Justices O'Connor and Souter as to this point, vehemently
disagree. Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Smith, which was joined by
Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, contains an extensive discussion of
the values underlying the respective clauses, and the role of both "categorical"
reasoning, and "balancing" in the Court's analysis. See 494 U.S. at 901-02
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
255 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 343-44 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting) ("'A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far'
unless it knows how far the regulation goes."' (citation omitted) "In failing to
undertake this inquiry, the Court ignores much of the impact of respondent's
conduct on petitioners."). Id. at 344 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992); Corp. of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the result) ("objective observer" test). There are, to be sure, constitutional
norms that draw their specific meaning from context, see, for example, U.S.
CONST. amend. IV ("upreasonable searches and seizures"), Bd. of Educ. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 (2002); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("speedy and public trial"), but
most do not. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole
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The difference between the two approaches is significant.
When the inquiry is "jurisdictional" that is, where the norm is
clear, there is no room for a judge or Justice bound by oath to
support and defend the Constitution as written to strike a "balance"
-- sensible or otherwise-that is inconsistent with either the fair
meaning of the norm, or the jurisdictional balance it strikes.
256
Where the meaning of the relevant norms is subject to
interpretation, or the balance between them unclear, the factual
inquiry required by the relevant standard of review will explicitly
include factual, legal, and political considerations.
257
In cases where the standard of review operates as either a
symbol of the Court's commitment to principle, or as a guide for
the "prudential" balancing of competing interests, the operational
content of the constitutional norm depends upon the weight the
Court assigns to the individual and state interests involved, and
may not be fixed for many years.
9
Power to try all Impeachments."); U.S. CONST. art. I § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors"); U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may
by Law have directed.").
256 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("In an appropriate case, I believe that we must further reconsider
our 'substantial effects' test with an eye toward constructing a standard that
reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting
our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.").
257 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2350-2365 (Thomas &
Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (examining in detail each of the reasons alleged to
support the University of Michigan's affirmative action policy); Klehr v. A.O.
Smith Corporation, 521 U.S. 179, 200 (1997) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring)
("Both the allurement and the vice of the 'mix-and-match' approach to statutes-
of-limitations borrowing (the possibility of which the Court today entertains) is
that it provides broad scope for judicial lawmaking .... It is, in other words, no
wonder that the Court finds the question it has posed for itself today 'subtle and
difficult;' judicial policy-wonking is endlessly demanding, and constructing a
statute of limitations is much more complicated than adopting one.").
... See infra text accompanying notes 268-323.
259 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2346 (2003) ("We expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary
to further the interest approved today.").
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B. To Whom Has the Power Been Delegated?
1. The Fourteenth Amendment & Jurisdiction to Prescribe Rules
Governing Civil & Human Rights
In a detailed and thought-provoking article on the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, Akhil Reed Amar observed
that:
because of the peculiar logistics of incorporation, the
Fourteenth Amendment itself often seems to drop out of the
analysis. We appear to be applying the Bill of Rights directly;
the Civil War Amendment is mentioned only in passing or not
at all. Like people with spectacles who often forget they are
wearing them, most lawyers read the Bill of Rights through the
lens of the Fourteenth Amendment without realizing how
powerfully that lens has refracted what they see.260
The same holds true for modem commentators who assume
that the political culture of the late 1930's is, or should be, the
starting point for our understanding of both separation of powers
and federalism. They view the Constitution through a Carolene
Products "lens," but do not realize how powerfully it has refracted
what they see.
261
If the Constitution, rather than footnote four,26 2 is the starting
point for analysis, the inquiry might eventually turn to "ideals,"
"values," and "political participation," but the first item on the
agenda would be the power allocation made by the Fourteenth
Amendment.263
260 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1136-37 (1991).
261 Professors David A. Schultz and Christopher E. Smith correctly chastise
those who urge "that a political, policy, or outcome model can adequately
explain a justice's opinions." SCHULTZ & SMITH, supra note 133, at xxi. See also
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1990).
262 See Linzer, supra note 18.
263 Accord Ely, supra note 80 at 86 ("Whatever may have been the case
before [the Civil War], the Fourteenth Amendment quite plainly imposes a
judicially enforceable duty of virtual representation of the sort I have been
describing.").
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That amendment was needed because the Reconstruction
Congress feared that a hostile Supreme Court would strike down
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress and the States wanted the
power to protect the rights of their citizens by legislation. The
Court had taken that power away from them in Dred Scott.264 The
Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities Clauses reclaimed that
power from the Court and gave it back to the federal government
and the states, respectively.
The Court would therefore have been the last branch of
government to which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment-
Bingham, Howard, and Sumner in particular-would have
entrusted the power to serve as final arbiter of the content of its
citizenship, liberty, and equality guarantees. 265 This is why the
power of the Court under the Fourteenth Amendment is not, as
Justice Brennan held, an "issue of academic interest only;, 266 it is
one of immense political and constitutional significance.
2. Human Rights and the Post-1937 Court
The Court did not come to its political and institutional senses
in 1937. It neither confessed error, nor made a bold statement that
judicial intervention on behalf of minorities and others is clearly
appropriate in all cases where federal or state law provides a basis
for such intervention. It did what comes naturally to any institution
264 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court
interpreted Article IV in a manner that negated the federalism it embodies. By
reading the scope of congressional power over the territories narrowly, the Court
gutted both the Missouri Compromise and the power of Congress under Article
IV, Section 3 to adopt "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2. By permitting the Missouri Supreme Court to refuse to give effect to
the law of Illinois governing the personal status and contractual capacity of
those who resided in Illinois or entered into contractual relationships to be
performed there, Jarrot v. Jarrot, 7 I11. (2 Gilm.) 1 (1845), the Court negated the
cooperative federalism implicit in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 555-58 (McLean, J., dissenting).
The gutting of Article IV made it impossible for either Congress or the free
states to protect the privileges and immunities of individuals living within their
respective jurisdictions.
265 See Louis Fisher, The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy, 25
SUFFOLK L. REv. 85 (1991).
266 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 264 n.37 (1970).
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that realizes its independence and institutional integrity are at risk.
It proposed a "deal." Legislative programs consistent, in the
Court's view, with either "the enlightened sentiment of
mankind,, 267 or the views of "the thoughtful part of the Nation" 
268
on economics or social policy would not be scrutinized too closely,
but state laws inconsistent with views of the Court's supporters
during the crisis of 1937 would be subjected to strict scrutiny. The
apparent hope was that if the Court remained progressive in its
outlook, Congress would leave it alone.269 Until Employment
Division v. Smith, it did.
And how have "minorities" (however defined) fared during the
nearly fifty-five years that elapsed between the Court's claim that
it had a special concern for minorities in Carolene Products and its
ostensible retraction of this concern in Smith?
a) Race Discrimination: Has Plessy Been Overruled?
We might begin by asking why the phrase "Plessy is
overruled" does not appear in any of the Court's opinions, either
before or after 1937. Though the Court has asserted that it
"repudiated" and "overruled ''2 70 Plessy v. Ferguson271 in Brown v.
267 In the Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), Justice Joseph Bradley wrote that "[t]he State
has a perfect right to prohibit ... all ... open offenses against the enlightened
sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the pretense of religious conviction by
which they may be advocated and practiced." Id. at 50.
268 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
269 Both Harris v. McRae and Bowers v. Hardwick are often cited as
examples of the Court's failure to take a principled stand in defense of minority
rights. Viewed as a question of "raw political power," however, the holdings in
both of these cases may reflect precisely the same calculus that undergirds
Carolene Products: a political judgment that political discretion is sometimes
the better part of valor. In McRae, 218 members of the House-a majority of the
whole-signed an amicus brief arguing that the Court had no power to order the
Congress to appropriate money from the Treasury, and that they would take a
dim view of judicial orders which flew in the face of their reading of Article I
Section 9, Clause 7. See Brief of Rep. Jim Wright, et al., and Certain Other
Members of the Congress of the United States as Amici Curiae, Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No 79-1268). A similar calculus may well have
affected the Court's judgment in Bowers. Cf The Defense of Marriage Act, 1
U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
270 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, (1992); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 767 (1974) (noting that Brown overruled Plessy);
[Vol. 12
THE REALPOLITIK OF FOOTNOTE FOUR
Board of Education,272 its words bespeak a more "nuanced"
approach.
The Court began its discussion in Brown I by acknowledging
that it had, in the years immediately following the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, construed Section One as:
contain[ing] ... a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to
the colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored,--exemption
from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.273
Had it stopped at this point and simply reaffirmed Strauder v.
West Virginia, the outcome would have been the same-the
demise of separate-but-equal. The constitutional principle derived
from the Equal Protection Clause and elaborated by the Court,
however, would have been very different-and crystal clear: no
race discrimination. Once again, the Court's words are instructive:
In approaching this problem [of school segregation], we
cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation
in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws .... We conclude that in the field of
Gomperts v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237, 1240 (1971) (opinion of Douglas, J., sitting
as Circuit Justice denying a motion for preliminary injunction pending the filing
of a Petition for Certiorari) (noting that "Plessy v. Ferguson has not yet been
overruled on its mandate that separate facilities be equal").
271 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
272 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) (quoting In re Slaughter-House Cases,
1873 (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72 (1872); Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880, 100 U.S.
303, 307-308 (1879) (known as Brown I).
273 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1880), quoted in
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 690 n.5.
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public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
274
How interesting. The Court cannot determine if racial
segregation "deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the
laws" until it first considers the importance of "public education is
in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation." 275 Why not?
There are two answers. First, the holding makes sense only if
the Court's rationale is understood as a Due Process analysis that
strikes a "sensible balance" between the seemingly intractable
demand of the Equal Protection Clause and a political reality
shaped by the "social fact" that racial prejudice is deeply engrained
in the culture, the political fact that desegregating the public
schools would be both difficult and dangerous, and the moral and
educational needs of children enrolled in public schools. Second,
the Court does not appear to consider itself bound by the Equal
Protection Clause. If the Equal Protection Clause is a rule of
conduct that binds both the Court and the states, the obligation of
the Court was clear. It was obligated to hold that the states must
immediately provide equal protection of the laws, regardless of
race. Period.
The Court, however, has never so held. Even though no one
can define the term "race," and its meaning varies over time,276 the
Court continues to believe that racial discrimination is a legitimate
tool for accomplishing social goals.277 Notwithstanding the
stigmatizing effect of race discrimination on all who are touched
by it,278 the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed every aspect of
274 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492-93, 495 (emphasis added).
275 Id. at 492-93.
276 See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990)
(Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., dissenting); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481
U.S. 615, 617 (1987); Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
12(1987).
277 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted 123
S. Ct. 617 (2002), aft'd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
278 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (citing Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). ("It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not
become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal
degree.").
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Plessy-including its "central holding"-except its paean to the
virtues of segregated schools.
The object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,
but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting,
and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the
inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally,
if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the
state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most
common instance of this is connected with the establishment of
separate schools for white and colored children, which have
been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even
by courts of states where the political rights of the colored race
have been longest and most earnestly enforced.
279
We can now see clearly why all those inner-city public
schools never got desegregated, and why so many court-ordered
desegregation plans did not have the impact their judicial designers
intended. Even after the Court's recent decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,280 children in most inner-city schools have
neither a velvet cushion on which to sit, nor a way out of their
substandard schools.28 1 Without a good education, neither do they
have much of a "choice" concerning what the Court calls in
another context "the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life., 282 Many are lucky if they even have a desk!
283
279 Plessy v. Ferguson, 193 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
280 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
281 See Daniel J. Monti, A SEMBLANCE OF JUSTICE (1985) (noting the
"heretical" possibility that "[p]erhaps .. .fights [over desegregation] merely
purchased the illusion of change, while providing a medium through which the
legitimacy of old boundaries and institutions could be reaffirmed by virtue of
having been tested so severely").
282 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
283 See Religion News Service, O'Connor School Plan Gets Merrill Lynch
Backing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 14, 1996, at D6 (noting that thousands of
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We might also ask why, as recently as 1992, the Court (with
Justice Scalia dissenting) felt it appropriate to caution that we
should not view the decision to overrule Plessy "merely as the
victor[y] of one doctrinal school over another," but rather as the
response of "the thoughtful part of the Nation" (as embodied,
apparently, in the Justices themselves) "to facts as they had not
been seen by the Court before., 284 What self-serving nonsense!
Section one of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments make it
clear that government-imposed or sanctioned racial subordination
has always been inconsistent with the concept of equal citizenship.
The Court knew the "facts of life" facing Black Americans
when it decided Dred Scott. It knew them when it reaffirmed
Scott's "central holding" in Plessy. It also knew them when it
reaffirmed Plessy's "central holding" in Brown. For whatever
reason, the Court has never been inclined to accept either the
principle of equal citizenship embodied in the text of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, or the power of Congress
to forbid race discrimination as such.285 To their credit, "the
People" of the States appear to disagree.
286
b) Religious Discrimination
Because many, if not most, thoughtful commentators on
contemporary constitutional issues assume the validity of the
power equation implicit in Justice Stone's famous Carolene
Products footnote, they find it difficult to imagine that the
Rehnquist Court's more balanced vision of judicial review could
be robust enough to assure protection of civil liberties, equality
before the law, and access to the political process. They respect its
influence, but are openly hostile to its approach.
New York City public school students were without desks this year); George
Will, Secret of School Success, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1996, final ed., at C7
(putting the number at 91,000 students).
284 Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
285 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287
(1978), a plurality of the Court held that "[i]n view of the clear legislative
intent," an explicit prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race means that
"Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would
violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." Id.
286 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art 1, § 3 1.
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No area of law bears better witness to this problem than the
Court's jurisprudence of the Religion Clause. Read together,
287 
'1 iSherbert v. Verner, Employment Division v. Smith,288 C ty of
Boerne v. Flores,289 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris290 demonstrate
how Carolene-style reasoning creates a conceptual muddle that can
take generations to untangle.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court was asked to decide whether
South Carolina could validly deny unemployment compensation to
a Seventh Day Adventist when its law contained an explicit
exemption for Sunday observers.29' The Fourteenth Amendment
unquestionably supplied the rule of decision, but the Court had to
make a choice of the governing norm: Due Process, or Equal
Protection?
292It should come as no surprise that it chose Due Process. An
equal protection rationale does not leave much room for judicial
discretion, and a holding that religion-based discrimination raises
serious constitutional questions would have required
reconsideration of the officially-sanctioned discrimination that lay
at the heart of the "school aid" branch of its emerging
jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause. 29 3 A Due Process
rationale, by contrast, leaves the judiciary in complete control of
which religious interests, practices, and groups will be protected.
In one of its early polygamy cases, the Late Corporation of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States,294 the
Court had held that the Free Exercise Clause should be understood
to permit "the State ... to prohibit ... all ... open offenses against
287 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
288 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
289 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
290 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
291 Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
292 id.
293 Compare Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (majority opinion)
with id., 330 U.S. at 23 (Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter & Burton, JJ.,
dissenting) ("Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is
more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values.").
Cf Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[O]nce [the
government] opens a neutral 'forum' (fiscal or physical), with secular criteria,
the benefits may not be denied on account of religion.").
294 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
2003] 445
WIDENER LAW JOURNAL
the enlightened sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the
pretense of religious conviction by which they may be advocated
and practiced., 295 A "compelling state interest" standard of
review296 embodies precisely the same standard: "the enlightened
sentiment of mankind., 297 The result? A free exercise standard of
review that was, at once, internally inconsistent, discriminatory as
applied,298 and inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the Equal
Protection Clause.
299
The problematic nature of using Carolene-style rules to
construct the free exercise standard of review was also apparent in
Smith. Oregon's law prohibiting peyote use was not "directed at
particular religious .. or racial minorities" (an "intent" standard),
but it did have the effect of imposing a substantial burden on
religious exercise. The individuals involved, Alfred Smith and
Galen Black, could be characterized as members of "discrete and
insular minority" groups. Both had engaged in the practice of
Native American religious beliefs and one was a Native
American. 30 It could also have been argued that federal judicial
intervention was necessary because Oregon's normal political and
judicial processes were neither sympathetic to the nature of the
challenged activity (peyote use), nor to the identity of the affected
group (adherents of Native American religions).
Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell has written that the
conventional wisdom among lawyers immediately prior to
Employment Division v. Smith was that the Supreme Court had
spoken with respect to the Free Exercise Clause. The balance of
295 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S.
1, 50 (1890).
296 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
297 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992)
(plurality opinion). The plurality's discussion of the reasons why West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish and Brown v. Board of Education should be overruled
stated that, "In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed
circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the
Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the
Court's constitutional duty." Casey, 505 U.S. at 864 (emphasis added).
298 See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 622, 625 (9th
Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
299 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
300 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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power between legislatures and courts over such matters was
viewed a matter of settled law, "and most academic commentators
were content to work out the implications of the doctrine rather
than to challenge it at its roots."30 1 Smith, however, did more than
"challenge [the doctrine] at its roots;" it ripped it out "root and
branch." Carolene Products logic would have predicted the
incremental application of the higher Sherbert standard of review,
however, the majority in Smith lowered it. Whereas Carolene
would mandate consideration of the importance of the right or the
impact of the prohibition on minority religions, the majority
opinion by Justice Scalia explicitly holds that neither the First nor
the Fourteenth Amendment requires consideration of either factor.
The Court's role in "those situations where representative
government cannot be trusted 30 2 to accommodate the interests of
religious minorities was also reconsidered. Carolene logic would
support judicial intervention on behalf of some "discrete and
insular" religious minorities, but not on behalf of individual
religious freedom across-the-board. 30 3 The post-Carolene logic of
Smith scraps the entire edifice because the majority of the
Rehnquist Court holds that the Court cannot be trusted either. The
majority opinion in Smith states:
Justice O'Connor contends that the 'parade of horribles' in the
text only 'demonstrates ... that courts have been quite capable
of... strik[ing] sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing state interests.' [citation to concurring opinion
omitted]. But the cases we cite have struck 'sensible balances'
only because they have all applied the general laws, despite the
claims for religious exemption. In any event, Justice O'Connor
mistakes the purpose of our parade: it is not to suggest that
301 Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990), quoted in SCHULTZ & SMITH, supra
note 133. But see Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and
the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
302 ELY, supra note 19, at 183.
303 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18, 18 n.18 (opinion of Brennan, Marshall & Stevens,
JJ.) (limiting legislative accommodations to relief of "demonstrated and possibly
grave imposition on religious activity sheltered by the Free Exercise Clause"
that do not "impose substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries"); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 481 U.S. 1036 (1987).
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courts would necessarily permit harmful exemptions from these
laws (though they might), but to suggest that courts would
constantly be in the business of determining whether the
'severe impact' of various laws on religious practice (to use
Justice Blackmun's terminology) or the 'constitutiona[l]
significan[ce]' of the 'burden on the specific plaintiffs' (to use
Justice O'Connor's terminology) suffices to permit us to confer
an exemption. It is a parade of horribles because it is horrible to
contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against
the importance of general laws the significance of religious
practice.
304
By holding that "[v]alues that are protected against government
interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not
thereby banished from the political process ,3 °5 Smith explicitly
rejects the very premise upon which the Carolene Products
footnote is based: an implicit claim of judicial supremacy over
civil and human rights policy. Small wonder that the decision in
Smith was viewed as the functional equivalent of a "repeal" of the
Free Exercise Clause itself,
30 6
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris30 7 rounds out the picture. Filed as
an Establishment Clause challenge to an Ohio voucher program
designed to remedy the lingering effects of Cleveland's history of
racially segregated public schools, 30 8 the case required the Court to
answer another tough question: Which norm takes priority? There
were only two possible answers: the Equal Protection Clause or the
Court's "due process" interpretation of the incorporated
Establishment Clause.
304 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).
311 Id. at 890.
306 In the view of the late Dr. Dean Kelley, the majority's rejection of the
"compelling state interest" standard of review in cases involving religious
practice burdened by laws of general applicability "repeals" the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. See Dean M. Kelley, The Judicial Repeal of the
Free Exercise of Religion in Testimony on the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1990 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d session, (1990) (statement of Dean M.
Kelley, Council of Churches of Christ in the USA).
307 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
308 See Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999).
448 [Vol. 12
THE REALPOLITIK OF FOOTNOTE FOUR
In Establishment Clause cases, the Court had long practiced
what Judge Guido Calabresi of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit once called "a form of affirmative action" in
favor of some, but not all, religious dissenters. 30 9 By the time
Zelman reached the Court in 2001, it had utilized Carolene-style
logic to create a body of law that gave preference to "the validity
of rules designed to protect the non-religious, even when such
rules, in practice, burdened religion and the religious"3 10 by
discriminating against those who sought to participate on an equal
basis in publicly funded education programs. Adding the race
factor stretched that logic to its breaking point.3 11 There was
simply no way to accommodate both sets of interests.
In Zelman, the Court again resolves the impasse by reference
to an equal protection standard: "neutral educational assistance
programs that ... offer aid directly to a broad class of individual
recipients defined without regard to religion" are permissible.
312
Gone is the case-by-case judicial parsing of the content or
perspective of the challenged program or materials, 313 thus
harmonizing the result with the rules governing cases arising under
the Speech and Press Clause.3 14 Gone too is the explicit, and
constitutionally forbidden,315 judicial assumption that professional
309 Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court: 1990 Term Foreword:
Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What The Bork-Brennan
Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REv. 80, 101 n.63 (1991) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
593-94 (1987); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985)). He noted that
"[s]uch rules could be viewed as examples of the dominant majority accepting
burdens on itself for the benefit of outcasts." Id.
310 Calabresi, supra note 311, at 101 n.63.
311 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E. 2d 203, 214 (2000) ("[T]he
Cleveland City School District is in a crisis related to the supervision order.").
312 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002).
313 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (standardized
tests); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975) (no public funding for
staff and materials for "auxiliary services" like guidance counseling and speech
and hearing services); Comm. for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
314 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119
(2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859-60
(1995); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780
(1995).
315 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (1787) (No Religious Test Clause).
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educators employed in religious schools will violate the public
trust imposed on the use of public funds for non-religious
purposes.
3 16
c) Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
The same abysmal pattern holds true for sex discrimination.
Bradwell v. State317 holds that states are not required to provide
equal privileges and immunities for men and women because "the
civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman." 318 It has taken years, at least one constitutional
amendment,319 numerous acts of Congress, 32° and the appointment
of two women to the Court to get the Court to grapple seriously
with how acknowledged physical differences can be
accommodated in a constitutional order that requires equal
protection of the laws. We are still waiting for a clear answer.
321
C. The Need for "Robust" Standards of Review in a Post-Carolene
Products Jurisprudence of Individual Rights
1. The Federal Courts and Jurisdiction to Prescribe
To many, the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence is a heretical
rejection of the conventional wisdom concerning two important
issues: (1) the origin and nature of the rights protected by the
Constitution and (2) the vision of judicial review enshrined in the
316 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-607 (1971).
31' 83 U.S. 130 (1873).3181 Id. at 141.
319 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
320 See generally LouiS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed.
2001) at 917-62 (discussing the central role of legislation in realizing the
promise of equal protection of the laws for women).
321 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Michael M. v.
Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Space does not permit an
extensive discussion of the confusing standards of review applicable in sex
discrimination cases, but the point is clear: The Court has yet to figure out what
the law of the Equal Protection Clause requires when laws take sex-based
differences into account.
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Court's post-1937 precedents. 322 The trend lines in the Court's
recent federalism and separation of powers cases are profoundly
unsettling to those who view the Court as the primary champion of
the rights of those whose interests are burdened by the democratic
process.
The discomfort so clearly in evidence in the literature
underscores the point of the Rehnquist Court's cases. The primary
role of the Court is to decide cases and controversies arising under
the Constitution and laws of the United States as written, not to
"make the ideals of the victorious activist Democracy [of the New
Deal] serve as a primary foundation for constitutional rights in the
United States."323 The only way for the Court to ensure that the
rights of individuals are protected from the power of the majority
faction in every case where the Constitution provides a limit on
that power is to adopt standards of review that are both clear and
consistently applied.
In order to operate as a guarantee, a constitutional norm must
first be identified, and then a standard of review appropriate to
enforce it must be enunciated. The focus in each case would then
be upon the manner in which the norm constrains government for
the benefit of individuals and local communities rather than the
Realpolitik of judicial power politics.
And thus, we return to the point made at the outset: that the
judicial power of the United States to "make" law is limited
structurally b'y the powers granted to Congress or reserved to the
States and the People. Where neither the Constitution itself, nor an
otherwise valid act of Congress supplies the substantive rule of
decision, the bare grant of jurisdiction to resolve a controversy
[jurisdiction to adjudicate] does not carry with it the power to
supply the substantive rule that governs its outcome [jurisdiction to
322 United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993),
judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995). In United States v. Edwards, the
Ninth Circuit described as "baffling if not heretical" the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of the Court's deferential post-1937 Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
323 Ackerman, supra note 37, at 714-15.
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324prescribe]. Simply stated, federal courts do not have the power
either to create or to modify substantive law.
325
2. FDR's Vision of the "Constitutional Moment:" The Function of
Judicial Review in a "Compound Republic"
The Constitution-not the New Deal-is the appropriate
starting point for an analysis of the so-called "New Federalism."
The Court's role in structural controversies is clear: Article III
requires that it decide where the political boundaries are, subject,
of course, to "prudential" constraints that should guide its
judgment in what Justice Robert Jackson called "the zone of
twilight '3 26 between and among the branches, and between the
federal government and the States.
327
Ackerman and other advocates of an activist vision of judicial
supremacy designed to foster the political agenda of the what was
then the progressive wing of the Democratic Party have argued that
the States' ability to defend their powers in the national political
process makes it inappropriate for the judiciary to exercise the
power of judicial review over the distribution of political
jurisdiction in disputes between Congress and the States.328
324 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), rev'g, Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
325 Discussion of the concept of "federal common law" is beyond the scope
of this paper. It should be sufficient to note that, to the extent that it is accurate
to describe what is known as "federal common law" as "common law" as that
term is commonly understood, its validity rests on powers clearly enumerated in,
or necessarily implied from, the Constitution itself.
326 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
327 This is an area of competence "in which [the President] and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Enforcement of the "fixed" boundaries of that "zone of twilight"
has significant consequences. Justice Jackson noted that "Courts can sustain
exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress
from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system." Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). This is, of course, precisely what is happening in the so-called "new
federalism" cases.
328 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See generally
Choper, supra note 214.
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Advocates of a robust application of Madison's vision of a
"compound republic" should argue precisely the opposite
proposition: that searching judicial review of all power claims
based on the Constitution is an integral part of the national and
state political processes that serve as the ultimate arbiters of our
rights.
Although the Court must be "above the fray" in the sense that
its decisions must provide a faithful rendition of "what the law is"
in the case before them, its role in the process is defined by the
"case or controversy" requirement of Article III: that is to frame, as
clearly as possible, the parameters of the policy question presented.
Some of the current members of the Rehnquist Court believe that
"[t]he root of American governmental power is revealed most
clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution
upon the Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this
Court."3 2 9 The real "root of American governmental power,"
however, is "the People," whose political power has been divided
in a compound republic, and who exercise it by voting in the States
and territories in which they live.
By claiming jurisdiction to prescribe under the Due Process
Clause in cases where reasonable minds can differ concerning both
the proper constitutional outcome and the Court's power to resolve
the controversy in the first instance, the Court invades the
legitimate powers of the political branches and the States and turns
the Fourteenth Amendment on its head. Each time it "calls the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national
division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution 330 under circumstances where the document leaves
the decision to the political branches, the Court loses legitimacy
and turns the confirmation process into a political battleground.
Worse, the Court's insistence that it is authorized to make
policy under the rubric of Due Process has allowed members of
Congress, Senators, the President, and state politicians to avoid
political responsibility. Making tough decisions and filling in the
political details in numerous areas of law, including civil rights
policy, is the essence of lawmaking. Each time the federal courts
are ready and willing to relieve politicians of the responsibility of
329 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
330 Id. at 867.
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lawmaking, the right of "the People" to a republican form of
national and state government is diminished.
It was inevitable that once the private sector was firmly under
federal control, private parties would seek to use the broad
language of statutes designed to regulate the economy to
reconstruct the policies and priorities of local self-government. It
was also inevitable that New Deal-style expansion of the size and
scope of state and local government would cause problems in areas
like labor and employment, trade regulation, and intellectual
property. The Court's proper role in these cases, however, has not
changed since the adoption of Article III in 1787; it is "to say what
the law is" without regard to the outcome of the political processes
by which we choose our leaders and representatives.
Nor has the constitutionally defined role of the federal
government changed since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. When Congress clearly has jurisdiction to prescribe
the rule of decision, as it does in cases otherwise within the scope
of the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the "compound" nature of the republic embodied in
Articles I, III, IV, and the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments
require that Court decline the Congressional invitation to legislate
on its behalf. Only Congress has both the power to bind the States
and the obligation to preserve the republican character of state
government. 31
This is why the Court's sovereign immunity cases strike
precisely the right balance. They neither "narrow the Nation's
power," nor deprive the affected individuals of a remedy to which
they are otherwise entitled. After Seminole Tribe332 and Alden v.
Maine, 333 the United States is free to take enforcement action on
their behalf if the President determines that it is in the public
interest to do so.334 Congress is free to write laws that explicitly
bind the States to federal standards of conduct, or to create special
331 Cf U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4; amend. X. A discussion of the ways in
which the most significant aspects of the Incorporation Doctrine can-and
should-survive under such an approach is beyond the scope of this Essay.
332 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
333 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
334 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (enforcement
of Equal Protection Clause against state university).
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copyright and trademark rules. The States are also free to bind
themselves, either by adopting parallel legislation and instructing
their courts to harmonize policy, or by waiving their sovereign
immunity in state or federal court.
Each of these options is a political act of the highest order.
Like the Court-packing plan, each available option entails political
risk. Some might even provoke a political firestorm of the
magnitude that attended FDR's 1937 "court reorganization plan."
We should be pleased that they do, and outraged when the courts
cut the process short. Political risk is an integral part of the system
of political accountability designed by the Framers. As Madison
put it in Federalist 51: "It is of great importance in a republic not
only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to
guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part.
3 35
And thus we arrive at the point where the Rehnquist Court's
approach to the standard of review stands in stark contrast to the
Carolene Products approach favored by the legal academy. The
Rehnquist Court's approach is "to say what the law is" and let the
political chips fall where they may. In all cases in which the
Constitution does not provide the rule of decision, it resolves what
FDR called the "unending struggle between those who would
preserve this original broad understanding of the Constitution as a
layman's instrument of government and those who would shrivel
the Constitution into a lawyer's contract"336 in favor of the voters
and their elected representatives. We cease to be "a nation under
lawyers."
337
The Carolene Products approach, by contrast, is rooted in the
Realpolitik of post-New Deal factional power politics. In this
vision, the Court is part of Roosevelt's "three-horse team," and
takes its political cues from the views of "the thoughtful part of the
Nation," who obligingly lobby the Court through impassioned
pleas in academic journals, editorial pages, and amicus briefs that
sometimes deprive the litigants of their power to confront and
335 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
336 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day, supra note 56.




cross-examine the witnesses against them.338 The "record" in a
Carolene Products case thus includes not only the facts of the case
or controversy sub judice, but also information concerning its
political character, the tenor of the times, and the relative political
position of the parties. Notwithstanding the command of the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court is free to play political favorites.
I wish to be clear. The preferential option for the poor and
politically powerless embodied in Carolene Products is not the job
of the courts alone. It belongs to us all. 339 And lest we get carried
away by the post-New Deal rhetoric about the Court's preference
for the rights of individuals, we should instead take a hard look at
its record. The names are familiar, but the characterization of the
cases may not be. The interests of Messrs. Olson340 and
Mistretta 34 got lost in the realities of the Realpolitik of separation
of powers. Individual rights were also at stake in cases involving
race relations (Grutter v. Bollinger, Virginia v. Black), corporate
speech and association (Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, Boy Scouts v. Dale), the Commerce Clause (Bendix v.
Midwest Autolite, United States v. Morrison), takings (Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission), and the Establishment Clause (Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, Davey v. Locke). In each of these areas, the logic of
Carolene Products counsels that the Court is the institution of
government best qualified to strike "sensible balances" between
individual and social needs. Courageous Presidents like Thomas
Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and FDR knew better. So should we.
CONCLUSION
The Introduction to this Essay noted that the task ahead was to
argue that the conventional wisdom about the Court's resolution of
the crisis of 1937 both begs the question of the Court's jurisdiction
to prescribe substantive rules governing our rights and misses the
point that history proves the Court unfit to be the sole repository of
338 Oral Argument for Grutter Bollinger, 2003 WL 1728613 (April 1,
2003).
339 See generally Robert A. Destro, Equality, Social Welfare and Equal
Protection, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (1986).
340 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
341 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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such power. When the Realpolitik of footnote four is taken into
account, the evasion is understandable. Lawyers, judges,
academics, and politicians like to argue that that the "crisis of
1937" was about "values" and "political participation," and hope
that other citizens will not notice that its real cause was an abuse of
power by the legal profession itself.
Like other factions who are convinced of their ability to
legislate for the common good, advocates for judicial supremacy
miss or reject Madison's point in Federalist 10 and 51: No faction
or branch of government can be trusted with preemptive power to
define our rights and duties. The Court's abysmal record in the
field of civil and human rights bears stark witness to its propensity
to strike "sensible balances" when the law requires a clear
decision.
It is for this reason that all of us-especially minorities-have
a better chance of solving our problems under the Rehnquist
Court's developing "post-Carolene Products" jurisprudence than
we have had under the regime bequeathed by Chief Justice Stone.
Under the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, legislatures would
control the purse and write the laws; the courts would be open to
all without discrimination; politicians and their parties would be on
notice that civil rights issues cannot be avoided by turning them
over to the courts.
The most important change, however, would be in the attitude
of a Court itself bound by the same rules that apply to everyone
else. Had they followed that laudable prescription in Plessy, they
could not have written that "[i]f the two races are to meet upon
terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a
mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary
consent of individuals.3 42 They might simply have applied the
Fourteenth Amendment as the Reconstruction Congress wrote it.
342 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (emphasis added). For a
discussion of why Plessy survives despite the Court's ruling in Brown v. Board
of Education, see supra text accompanying notes 272-87.
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